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Abstract
This paper provides a critical analysis of the French law
introduced in 2003, which prohibits religious symbols being
worn in public schools. It is shown that, although the law
appears to be neutral, the practical reality is that Muslim women,
who wear the Hijab, are targeted by this law significantly more
than any other religious group.
It is shown that the prohibition on religious symbols in France is
disproportionate to the aims which France claims the measure
seeks to achieve. Moreover, it is argued that France has failed to
establish convincingly that such an intrusive interference is
necessary in a democratic society, and also that it was the least
intrusive measure available to the state.
In accordance with the arguments summarised above, it will be
shown that, France has breached Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to
which it is a High Contracting Party.
To support this assertion, the paper centres on an evaluation of
two previous ECtHR rulings (Dahlab v Switzerland and Sahin v
Turkey): in both cases the applicants, who were Muslim women,
had been prohibited from wearing their Hijabs in public schools.
These cases are evaluated as in both cases High Contracting
Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights also
restricted the Hijab in public schools; these restrictions were also
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justified on the same grounds as the French ban, such as
secularism and gender equality.
This paper is critical of the approach taken by the European
Court of Human Rights in its highly deferential approach in
favour of the High Contracting Party. It is argued that the margin
of appreciation doctrine, which the European Court used in
allowing such discretion to the High Contracting Party, was
misapplied as the doctrine requires effective European
supervision, which was lacking in the European Court rulings.
This paper goes on to examine the notion of secularism used by
France in justifying the prohibition, to conclude that France
employs a fundamentalist version of secularism, which is
incompatible with the European Convention as the wearing of
religious symbols is compatible with the liberal, democratic and
pluralist values which underpin the Convention.
Introduction
In 2003, France introduced a law l which prohibited the wearing of
all ostentatious religious symbols inside public schools. Following this,
other states have followed suit, or at least relied upon the French approach
to support a similar stance or even to extend the scope of the prohibition to
all public areas." In anticipation of a ruling by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), the aim of this paper is to assess the compatibility
of the law with Article 9 (Freedom of Thought Conscience and Religion)
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which France is
a High Contracting Party (HCP). In particular it will be investigated
whether the measure contravenes the principle of proportionality, inherent
throughout the ECHR, which requires that measures which interfere with a
fundamental freedom or right are proportional to the legitimate aims,
which the HCP claim the measure seeks to achieve.
To help determine and understand how the ECtHR may address an
application under Article 9, by an applicant claiming to have his or her
rights to manifest their religion violated without justification, this paper
will centre on the evaluation of two similar previous cases of Dahlab3 and
1 Loi No 2004-22X du 15 Mars 2004, Journal Officiel No 65.
2 One such state is Belgium.
3 Dahlab v Switzerland, ECHR 2001-V 449.
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Sahin. 4 In both cases, the applicants were Muslim women, who were
prohibited from wearing the Islamic headscarf/veil (hereafter referred to as
the Hijab) inside public schools. The relevance of these cases is that in
both the principle of secularism was relied upon by the HCPs to justify the
restrictions. The ECtHR's ruling in favour of the HCP in both cases, and
the wide margin of appreciation it allowed, was also largely based on the
principle of secularism. It is also the main principle on which France bases
its prohibition on religious symbols.
By examining the key elements of reasoning relied upon by the
HCPs and the ECtHR in the similar cases of Dahlab and Sahin, the author
aims to show that the margin of appreciation afforded was too wide and
inappropriate to safeguard the rights and interests of the applicants; and
that, in the event of an application against the French law, the ECtHR must
undertake a proper scrutiny of the arguments put forward by the state, to
provide a clear and authoritative ruling. The implications of how the
ECtHR addresses these issues are significant, as it will determine the
scope of religious rights to be enjoyed by millions of people.s
The paper will argue that, whilst the aim was legitimate, the
measures taken by France in pursuit of those aims were disproportionate,
therefore failing to meet the requirement of proportionality.
Part I introduces the Hijab debate in Europe, briefly considering the
ECHR and the scope of protection afforded by Article 9. It then goes on
to consider the causes of the debate, being the clash of values between an
increasingly secular Europe with the emergence of a Muslim population,
who are more assertive and expressive of their religion. Having assessed
the two main forms of secularism and their compatibility with the values
underpinning the ECHR, the approach adopted by France and Turkey, two
secular HCPs, is examined to evaluate how they have interpreted the scope
of the freedom to manifest one's religion, within a democratic secular
society.
In part 3 the jurisprudence of the ECtHR under Article 9, with
particular reference to the previous cases of Dahlab and Sahin, is critically
analysed, to understand how and why the Court ruled in favour of the
state, to draw inferences for a possible case in similar circumstances
against France.
4 Leyla Sahin v Turkev, No 44774/98. para 34 (Eur Ct H R June 29. 2004).
5 Sikhs, Christians and Jews are all amongst the religions adversely affected by the French law, which
introduced the prohibition of religious symbols in public schools. Furthermore any decision by the Court will
also have an effect on all High Contracting Parties, as well as judges in national courts around the world; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, "A Typology of Transjudicial Communications", 29 U. Rich L Rev 99; Eyal
Benvenisti,"National Courts and the International Law on Minority Rights", 2 Austrian Rev Int 'I & Eur L I.
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Part 4 will subject the interpretation and application of the principle
of secularism in France to careful examination, to conclude which form of
secularism required an absolute ban on all ostentatious religious symbols
in public schools, and how such a ban was necessary to maintain that form
of secularism.
Part 5 will summarise the conclusions and observations made during
the whole paper, following the critical analysis of the key cases, to
conclude whether the prohibition imposed in France was proportional and
necessary.
1. Freedom of Religion in Europe
1.1 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms
The proposal to create a system guaranteeing the human rights of
everyone within the jurisdictions of a united Europe was born out of the
aftermath of the Second World War. 6 Following that gruesome war which
consumed most of Europe,? there was a strong desire to create a collective
safeguard to prevent isolated and exhausted states becoming corrupted
through McCarthyism, communism or fascism. While fascism had
disfigured most of Europe, the threat of communism from the east and
McCarthyism from the west had to be addressed. A regional system of
human rights protection was thought to be the ideal solution, to prevent the
recurrence of atrocious human rights violations witnessed during the
Second World War.
The European movement that followed promptly focused on
establishing a European Union, based fundamentally on the principles of
Human Rights; to secure liberty, peace, unity and economic prosperity.s
Soon after the formation of the Council of Europe in 1949, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council authorised the Consultative Assembly9 to
include on its agenda as a matter of priority, the maintenance and further
realisation of human rights. This was in furtherance of the Council of
Europe's aims which were to:
6 P. Van Dijk & G.JH Van Hoof, Theory And Practice qfThe European Convention On Human Rights § I (3d
ed 1998).
7 As well as most of the rest of the world.
8 Alistair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edition, (Oxford,
2006.), p 3.
9 Now known as the Parliamentary Assembly.
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Achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are
their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social
progress. 10
Following a report which it had commissioned, the Consultative Assembly
recommended that the Committee of Ministers should undertake the
drafting of a Convention to protect ten basic human rights. The
Committee of Ministers in tum appointed a committee of government
experts to initiate the drafting process of a human rights Convention.
Following the drafting process, a final text was approved and The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was signed by the Committee of Ministers at
Rome on the 4th of November 1950. 11
The ECHR 12 was the step after the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the United Nations General Assembly.13 The creation of the
legally binding treaty can be seen as the 'natural progression' 14 towards
the collective enforcement of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.
Although inspired by the UDHR,15 the ECHR differs from the Declaration
by focusing specifically on the protection and advancement of civil and
political rights,16 through its implementation machinery. I? The ECHR
provides an effective complaints procedure under which inter-state l8 and
individual complaints l9 can be made, referring alleged breaches of the
Convention to the ECtHR.
The preamble of the ECHR provides an in-depth insight into the
vision and intention of those who drafted and signed it: it states that the
prerequisite to justice and peace is the common understanding and
10 First Session of the Consultative Assembly held At Strasbourg 10th August to 8th September 1949 . Settings
Held from 16th August to 8th September 1949; Collected Edition of the "Travaux P,,;paratoires" Volume I
Martinus, Nijhoft~ The Hague, 1975
II Coming into force on the 3rd of September 1953, Upon foundation on there were ten members: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom
12 Opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (came into force 3 September 1953). The
Convention has been amended through 12 additional protocols.
13 Adopted on 10 December 1948, UN GA Res 217 A (1Tl), UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
14 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (Pearson Education Ltd, 2003), P 137.
15 The Universal Declaration is referred to in the preamble of the ECHR.
16 Unlike the Universal Declaration which also considers social, economic and cultural rights.
17 Since Protocol 11 came into force on 1 November 1998, a permanent and full-time Court of Human Rights
now decides on the admissibility and merits of applications. Previously, it was the Commission that decided
issues of admissibility.
18 ECHR Article 33.
19 ECHR Article 34.
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observance of human rights, best maintained through an effective political
democracy.20
1.1.1 Article 9 - Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Among other substantive rights, one of the fundamental freedoms
protected in the ECHR, is the freedom of thought conscience and religion.
One of the main reasons why the freedom of religion was deemed to be a
'fundamental, undisputed freedom'21 was because of the vulnerability of
religious minority groups, to having their human rights violated, evident in
the persecution of the Jews. Through the 20th century the totalitarian Nazi
regime led by Adolf Hitler, subjected the Jews who were both a religious
and ethnic group, to unspeakable persecution. This initially manifested in
discriminatory practices carried out towards the Jews that led to the' final
solution', which involved 'the Holocaust', in which approximately six
million Jews were killed in extermination camps.22
Thus, it was clear early in the drafting process that freedom of
religion was to be included in the rights and freedoms protected in the
ECHR. The final text prepared by the Consultative Assembly included a
right to freedom of religion, which was largely based on Article 18 of the
UDHR, which the delegates considered an appropriate model for the
protection of freedom of religion.2J
Article 9 ECHR provides:
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety,
20 Preamble to the ECHR.
21 Collected Edition of the "Travaux Preparatoires" Volume I at 46 Martinus, Nijhoft~ The Hague, 1975.
22 Niewyk, Donald L. The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust (Columbia University Press, 2000), p45: "The
Nazis also killed millions of people belonging to other groups: Gypsies, the physically and mentally
handicapped, Soviet prisoners of war, Polish and Soviet civilians, political prisoners, religious dissenters, and
homosexuals."
23 Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxlord, 2001), P 40.
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for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 9( I) encompasses the positive scope of the Article; it expressly
includes the right to manifest one's religion or belief in both private and
public spheres.
Whilst the 'sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds',24 or the
forum internum, is free from restrictions,25 Article 9(2) provides five broad
grounds under which the freedom to manifest one's religion (forum
externum), may be legitimately restricted.
In regards to the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief in
practice, the ECtHR has held that the term 'practice' used in Article 9( I) is
not absolute, and does not cover 'each act... motivated or influenced by a
religion or belief' .26 The manifestation will only fall under the scope of
Article 9( I), if the applicant can establish sufficient evidence of his or her
beliefs,2J and that the manifestation is required by those beliefs,2R or that
there is a sufficient link between the manifestation and the beliefs held.29
1.1.2 Freedom of Religion in an increasingly Secular Europe30
Throughout the HCPs of the ECHR different approaches can be seen
regarding the relationship between religion and state. While some states
such as France,ll Germany,32 Turkey3J and Ukraine34 advocate a secular
role, committed to the separation of church and the state, other states, such
24 C v United Kingdom, App NO.1 0358/83.37 European Commission HR Dec.& Rep 142 (1983).
25 Privately held beliefs under the Convention are free from state interference; it is only once the beliefs arc
manifested that the state is entitled to impose restrictions (subject to the conditions set out in Article 9.2); Tom
Lewis, 'What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation' (2007) ICLQ
at 400.
26 Arrowsmiih v ihe United Kingdom (1978) 19 Eur Comm HR 5, 19.
27 X v Germany (App No 4445170) decision of April I, 1970
28 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (App N07050175), 19 DR 5, where the Commission suggested that for an
action to be considered a practice under Article 9, a very direct link is needed between the belief and the action.
29 Knud,en v Norway (App No 11045/84),42 DR 247. In this case, in contrast to Arrowsmith the Commission
held that the question is whether the actions ofthe applicant "give expression" to his or her religion or belief.
30 "Secular Europe confirmed by po\l"; http://www.iht.com/articles/2005106/06/news/religion.php. see also
http://www2.ljwor!d.com/news/2005/apr/08/in_increasingly.secular/
31 Described in the preamble of its Constitution as no republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and socia/";
Constitution of the Republic of France 1958.
32 The German Basic Law (1949) incorporated into from Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution 1919,
provides that there "shall be no state church".
33 Described in its Constitution as a "democratic, secular and social state"; Article 2 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Turkey.
34 The Constitution of Ukraine was referring to 'responsibility before God' also states that the state and school
must be separate Irom the church and religions; Article 35 Constitution of Ukraine 1996.
29
as Greece,35 maintain a strong relationship between the state and a church
or religion.
In regard to human rights standards, both approaches may be
compatible36 with the ECHR as well as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights37 (ICCPR) as stated by the Human Rights Committee:
The fact that a religion is recognised as a state religion ... , shall
not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights
under the Covenant, including articles 18 (Freedom of Thought,
Conscience or Religion) and 27, nor in any discrimination
against adherence to other religions or non-believers. 3H
Similarly, it has been argued that 'secularism guarantees freedom of
conscience.. .lt is the neutrality of the public arena which permits the
various religions to coexist, harmoniously' .3'!
The threat posed to human rights, by states dominated by religious
fundamentalists, is widely acknowledged and recognised.40 One dominant
religion may have significant influence over political institutions or
decision-making and other religions may be restricted or prohibited from
exercising their freedom of religion41 •
However, various forms of secularism also exist, not all of which are
compatible with human rights. 42 The two main forms of secularism have
been identified as 'fundamentalist secularism' and 'liberal secularism' .43
While both view religion as a 'private issue', the distinction between them
lies in the definition of the public and private sphere.
Liberal secularism implies that religious groups should not have
power over political institutions or interfere with decision-making in a
manner which restricts the rights and freedoms of others. Nonetheless, it
35 The Constitution of Greece (1975/1986) provides that the "prevailing religion in Greece is that orthe Eastern
Orthodox Church of Jesus Christ, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head" (Article 3).
36 Harvard Human Rights Program, Religion and the State (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Law School, 2(04).
37 Which came into force March 23, 1976.
38 General Comment 22 (20 July 1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/2I/Rev I/Add 4.
39 Speech by President Jacques Chirac of the French Republic, Paris 17 December 2003; http://www.elysee.fr
40 See the annual Repurts of the United Nations Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur on Freedum
of Religion; http://www.un.org/unhcr.
41 For example the Constitution of the Republic ur Iran 19XO, which describes Iran as an Islamic State.
Otticial, or Iranian government have to be educated in Muslim law and practices and unly three other religions
are permitted (Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian).
42 Ingvill Thorson Plesner, The European Court on Human Righl.\' between Fundamentalist and f,iheral
Secularism, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights; http://www.strasbourgconfcrcnce.org.
43 ibid, P 1.
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does not prohibit manifestations of religion or belief within the public
sphere; including public institutions.44
Fundamentalist secularism however, implies that as a private issue,
all religious manifestations must be confined to the realm of private areas
such as homes and places of worship.4j Manifestations must not enter the
public sphere, especially public institutions. The fundamentalist aspect of
this approach is that only this 'one truth' or secularist way must prevail
over all individuals who enter the public domain.
Thus, it is submitted that both religion and secularism can pose a
threat to human rights. As Europe is becoming more culturally diverse,46
the balancing act of contrasting ideologies which HCPs must undertake to
comply with the Convention is becoming increasingly complicated and
difficult.
1.2 The Emergence of Cultural Diversity in Europe
However great the foresight of the visionaries who drafted the
ECHR, it is not conceivable that in attempting to guarantee the essential
rights of all those within the jurisdiction of HCP, all scenarios could have
been contemplated.
From the end of the last world war to the present day, Europe has
undergone drastic social transformation, following, inter alia, the massive
surge of immigrants, to satisfy labour demands in various European states.
The migration trends across the European states between the late 1940s
and early 1970s varied, and depended upon the geographic location and
post-colonial or imperialist history of the European states in regard to the
migrant countries. Thus, while Germany received large numbers of
migrants from Turkey, and the United Kingdom from South Asia and the
Caribbean, France received workers mainly from Africa.47 The millions of
migrants not only contributed to the economic growth and prosperity of
modern Europe, providing much-needed flexibility to the labour force,4R
but also to its cultural, ethnic and religious diversity.
Owing to their cultural and traditional histories, many of the
immigrants came with different political, religious and moral opinions and
44lhid, p2. This is in accordance with Article 9 lOeHR, whieh guarantees the right to manifest one's religion or
helief in publie or private.
45 Ihid, p3.
46 Per Lord Walker in R (Williamson) v. Secre/",)' ojS/ale/oj' Fducarion and L'mp!ol'mel1ll2005] 2 AC 246, at
paragraph 54.
47 Antoine Boulange, HiJab, "Racism and the Slate Is", Issue: 102, Internationa! Socialism Journal, Spring
2004. p 3.
4X Ihid, P 34,
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beliefs. Nonetheless, perhaps unknown to them, having arrived in certain
European states,49 they entered, not only into European territory, but the
jurisdiction of the European Convention, which expressly provides that:
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this
Convention. '50
The ECHR, however, had little relevance and effect early on.
Initially, in the absence of a declaration by the HCP, only inter-State
applications could be made, and these were rarely used and unpopular.\1
However, as of 1 November 1998 when Protocol I1 came fully into force,
the individual complaints procedure became an automatic and compulsory
procedure for all HCPs,s2 which has been used vastly more than inter-state
applications.
Nonetheless, the fundamental need of the newly forming minority
groups was not establishing religious expression or identity, but security,
including employment, housing, language and family issues. 53 The first
immigrant generation may also have readily adopted a foreign culture and
embraced the mission to appear non-threatening and invisible, possibly
due to fears of discrimination, intolerance or hostility. 54 Once these
essential needs were met, attention was turned to securing rights of
religious expression and identity.55
However, when the manifestations of beliefs of the minority
immigrant groups are perceived to contradict with the liberal ideals of the
majority of the democratic, secular, pluralist European population, a
conflict of opinions and beliefs is created.
This conflict, created by a 'clash of civilisations' ,5" needs to be balanced
carefully under the Convention: it is important to reconcile the interests of
all concerned to ensure everyone's beliefs are respected.57
Real difficulties arise when there are numerous religions with
separate and unique beliefs and different cultures, whose adherents reside
in a host country not of their origin, which enjoys its own distinct culture,
49 By the end of 1970, along with the original 10 contracting parties, II more had joined; Greece, Turkey,
Iceland, Germany, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Liechtenstein (order of date joined)
50 Article I to the ECHR.
51 Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law (Pearson Education Ltd, 2(03), P159.
52 Article 34 ECHR.
53 Samantha Knights, "Religious symbols in the school: freedom of religion, minorities and education" (2005)
EHRLR, p2.
54 C Killian,' The Other Side of the Veil-North African Muslim Women in France Respond to the Headsearf
Affair' 17 (4) Gender and Society, 2003 (567-90), 588.
55 M Fitzgerald, Christians and Muslims in Europe: Perspectivesfhr Dialogue at www.sedos.org
56 S Huntingdon,' The Clash of Civilizations' (1993) 72 Foreign Alfilirs 22.
57 Dahlab v Switzerland, Application No 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V, para 83.
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and may follow a different religion, or even have no state religion in place.
This political and social scenario can be seen in Europe, where the visible
emergence of a part of the population who are more self-righteous and
proud of their religious heritage and culture58 has concerned some, who see
Europe 'becoming a land of Islam'. 59
1.3 Islamic Debate in Europe
Unlike the immigrant families they descend from, who tried to blend
in, a small but growing60 proportion of the later generation are more
assertive of their Islamic identity61 and wish to be recognised as such. They
benefit both from being born into the country and, as nationals, do not feel
the need to be invisible; they also benefit from the modern international
commitment to human rights and freedom from discrimination, which
champions their cause.
Critics point out that Islam is repressive, irrational, sexist and
incompatible with liberal democracy.62 Furthermore, unlike 'moderate'63
Muslims, those who are strict adherents are often suspected to be part of
the increasing Islamic fundamentalism,64 a movement which is allegedly
threatening secularism, aiming65 to defy the separation between church and
state.
This has fuelled a debate about multiculturalism and Human Rights
in various European states. 66 Within this broad debate is the controversial
58 A Krieger-Krynicki, 'The Second Generation: The Children of Muslim Immigrants in France' in T Gerholm
and YG Lithman (eds), The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe (London, Mansell. 1988), 123-32.
59 N AISayyad and M Castells, 'Introduction: Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe' in N AISayyad and
M Castells (eds), Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam (Lanham, MD. Lexington Books, 2002) 1-6, I .
60 For example, an increasing number of Muslim women across Europe are beginning to wear the Hijab
(especially France); White Muslim Women Who Wear the Hijab in Britain Today', 23(5) Ethnic and Racial
Studies (2000) 917-29; C Killian, op cit, 567-90; MD Brown, 'Multiple Meanings of the Hijab in Contemporary
France' in WJF Keenan (ed), Dressed to Impress: Looking the Part (Oxford, Berg, 2001) 105-21, F Gaspard and
F Khosrokhavar, Le jiJUlard et la republique (Paris, La Decouverte, 1995)
61 F Gaspard and F Khosrokhavar, Lefoulard et la republique (Paris, La Decouverte, 1995).
62 Tom Lewis, 'What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation' ,
(2007) ICLQ at 395. The ECtHR has also held that Islamic law or the Sharia "is incompatible with the
fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the convention": Relah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v Turkey
200337 EHRR I at para 123.
63 "One who identifies himself strongly with the idea of a liberal Islam and also advocates moderation in the
manifestation and expression oflslamic politics", Muqtedar Khan, PhD;
http://www.islamfortoday.com/khan08.htm
64 J Scales-Trent, "African Women in France: Immigration, Family and Work", (1999) 24 Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 705.
65 "To re-establish a degree of clerical authority over private life and public policy that Christian churches ...
have not enjoyed for a long time"; J Smith,' Religion Must Be Kept in Its Place', The Times, 18th of March
2004.
66 A Colvin (2004), op cit.; P Taylor, 'Hijab Battles Around The World,' Islamic Horizons Magazine
(November-December 1994)
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debate on the Hijab, which epitomises the broader debate, as it ties In
issues such as secularism, fundamentalism and gender inequality.
1.3.1 The Islamic Headscarf Debate
[The] Islamic dress, especially the Hijab, has played a pivotal
symbolic, ritual and political role in the Islamic movement. The word
'veil' has a range of different meanings:67
1. From a sense of communication: hiding, disguised, concealment and
deception.
2. A material dimension, this covers the clothing aspect: in the sense
of covering their heads, shoulders or face.
3. A spatial or temporal sense: this is a reference to a screen or
invisibility, specifying the veil as a screen which creates a physical
barrier.
4. The last description is of religious vesture: providing seclusion from
worldly life and a symbol of chastity or celibacy.
The word 'Hijab' is found in the Quran and can be argued to be an
amalgamation of the third and fourth definition:"x
And say to believing women
That they should lower
They gaze and guard
Their modesty; that they
Should not display their
Beauty and ornaments except
What (must) ordinarily appear
Thereof; that they should
Draw their veils over
Their bosoms and not display
Their beauty except,
To their husbands, to their fathers ...
Their sons ... their brothers ...
Or their women ...
67 Formulated trom different delinitions provided in F El Gundi, Veil, Modestv, Pri!'oc" ond Resistance
(Oxford, Berg, 1999), pp 6-7.
68 Surah. XXIV, verse 31, reproduced in A Yusuf Ali, The Qur 'an-Text, Translation and Commentary
(Maryland, Amana Corporation, 1983),904-5.
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From this religious prescription, it can be asserted that the Hijab is merely
a practical tool to achieve and preserve piety, modesty and chastity.
However, many different interpretations and understandings exist for this
specific text. Indeed, the Hijab can be seen to represent and symbolise
many different meanings: 'Emancipation can be expressed by wearing the
veil or by removing it. It can be secular or religious. It can represent
tradition or resistance '.69
The wearing of a Hijab can be an active political symbol, such as
resistance to colonialism70 or political opposition. 71 The most
comprehensive study dealing with the views of young French Muslim
women to the veil, found wearing the Hijab as an empowering symbol of
their identity.72
There are many different theories and reasons given for why the
Hijab is worn, but what is beyond dispute is the fact that it has been very
controversial: the debate it has created has been considered by some as a
'showdown between democratic values and fundamentalism'. 71 Within
such a debate, a HCP to the ECHR must, in maintaining public order,
balance numerous vital interests, including the rights and freedoms of
others as well as the demands of pluralism. 74 The European Court of
Human Rights has acknowledged75 that in such fragile circumstances,
where necessary, restrictions may have to be placed on the freedom of
religion, to strike the 'fair balance' ,76 a balance which 'ensures the fair and
proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a
dominant position '.77
We shall now consider law and practice in two selected HCPs; to see
how the balance between secularism and the freedom to manifest one's
religion has been struck in different democratic societies.
69 F EI Gundi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance (Oxford, Berg, 1999).
70 F. Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970),21-52 on' Algeria Unveiled'.
71 M Tavokili-Targhi,' Women of the West Imagined: The Farangi Other and the Emergence of the Women
Question in Iran' in Moghadam.
72 F Gaspard and F Khosrokhavar, Le foulard etla republique (Paris, La Decouverte, 1995).
73 B-H Levy, "Otr With Their Headscarves", The Guardian, 1 February 2004.
74 Levla Sahin v Turkey, Fourth Section, Application No 44774/98, Judgment of 29th of June 2004, para 100.
75 Dahlab v Switzerland, Application No 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V, paragraph 83.
76 Leyla Sahin v Turkey, Fourth Section, Application No 44774/98, Judgment of 29th of June 2004, para 100.
77 Leyla Sahin v Turkey, Fourth Section, Application No 44774/98, Judgment of 29th of June 2004, para 108.
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2. Current Approach Adopted by Selected HCPs
Having considered the various factors in the Islamic Hijab debate in
Europe, in particular freedom of religion and secularism, both of which
can pose a threat to democracy, we shall now review the practice in
Turkey78 and France; HCPs who are committed to the democratic values
underpinning the ECHR. This is to analyse how these two different
secularist European states, which both have a strong historical religious
tradition, have attempted to strike a balance between the two contrasting
concepts.
2.1 Modern 'Secular' Turkey
Mustafa Kemal Atattirk became the founding father of modern
Turkey, after liberating the country from foreign occupiers, who had
invaded after the demise of the Ottoman Empire.79 In an attempt to
modernise Turkey, he brought in radical reforms to destroy the Islamic
culture and influence in society,XO which he felt was imposed by the
Ottoman Empire, in a process he called 'secularism', later known as
'Kemalism'. HI
Subsequently, in 1921, the Turkish Grand National Assembly
drafted the first Constitution of the Turkish Republic, establishing a
national identity, rather than a religious one;82 this can be seen as the
Constitutional foundations of the principle of secularism in Turkey, which
were expressly manifested later. 83
After his death in 1946 a multi-party system was introduced, with
each party having its own policies and definitions of secularism. Amid
social and economic distress, which prompted two military cOUpS,X4
78 However for the purposes of this dissertation, which is set in the context of the French ban 2004, more
emphasis will be given to the French debate. For an in-depth review of the dispute in Turkcy bctween
secularism and Islam, including the Hijab debate see; Benjamin D Bleiberg, Unveiling the Real Issue:
"Evaluating the European Court Of Human Rights' Decision To Enforce The Turkish Hcadscarf Ban In Leyla
Sahin v Turkey", (2005) I( 129) Cornell Law Review.
79 Nicole Pope & Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and Alier (1997), 50--{i2.
80 Talip Kueukean, "State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modem Turkey: Reeonfiguralion of Religion in the
Public Sphere", 2003 BYU L REV 475,485-89.
81 Susanna Dokupil, "The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modem Turkey", (2002)
105 W.vA.L.REV, 53,65.
82 Ergun Ozbudun, Constitutional Law, Introduction To Turkish Law (Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. cds,
1996),19,21.
83 The principle of secularism was first established in the Turkish Constitution in a 1937 amendment; Leyla
Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para 27 (Eur C.HR June 29, 2(04).
84 One in 1960 and the other in 1971.
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political Islam was born. The NSP~5 began to advocate a fundamentalist
view of Islam, and openly campaigned against Kemalistsecularism.ln
1980 the military seized control of the government for the third time,
following terrorism and religiously motivated violence. The National
Security Council was established, which amended the Constitution to grant
itself greater power and legal immunity.86
The military's 1982 Constitution marked the return to the
'nationalism of Atatiirk', declaring the country a 'democratic, secular and
social state governed by the rule of law'. H7 It is clear that the Constitution
was formulated to preserve the integrity of Turkey,8s with the drafters
claiming to have 'built an armoured wall against those who want to split
our country'. 89
2.1.1 Hijab Debate in Turkey
The NSC began an immediate assault on the Hijab, bringing an end
to the' liberalisation of the dress regulations' ,90 which had been enjoyed
following Atatiirk's death. In 1981, the Regulation concerning the Dress
of Students and Staff in Schools banned any type of head covering in
public organisations. A year later the Hijab was banned from lecture
rooms;91 this ban was later upheld by the Supreme and Administrative
Court, finding the Hijab incompatible with secularism and women's
equality.92
Following the ruling of the Grand Chamber of ECtHR in Leyla
Sahin v. Turkey91 which upheld the prohibition on Hijabs in universities,
similar applications have been declared inadmissible, with the ECtHR
following its reasoning in Sahin. 94
85 National Salvation Party.
86 Ergun Ozbudun, Conslilulional Law, Introduction To Turkish Law (Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds,
1996),24-5 .
87 1982 TUKiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi [Turkish Constitution] Article 2.
88 In consideration of the "ever present Turkish fear of separatism": Benjamin D Bleiberg, Cornell Law Review,
2005, op cil, Vol I: 129, 138.
89 Nicnle Pope & Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled' Alalurk and Afier (1997) 150.
90 Benjamin D Bleiberg, Cornell Law Review, 2005, op. cil., vol 1: 129, 140.
91 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para. 34 (Eur Ct HR, June 29, 2004).
92 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para 34 (Eur Ct HR, June 29, 2004).
93 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para. (Eur Ct HR, June 29, 2004) Grand Chamber
94 In 2006 and 2007, the Court declared applications in 6 cases inadmissible: KurlUlmu$ v. Turkey (App No
655001(1); K6se v. Turkey (App No 26625/02); t:;aglayan v. Turkey (App No 1638/04); Falma Karaduman v
Turkey (App No 41296/04); Tandogan v. Turkey (App No 41298/04); Yilmaz v. Turkey (App No 37829/05).
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2.2 France
While the Hijab debate is prevalent in most European states, France
has arguably created the greatest opposition to the Hijab,'J5 with the
exception of Turkey.96 There are numerous factors which have contributed
to the French debate on the Hijab, and why specifically in France it has
been so controversial.
2.2.1 Constitutional History of France
One of the most fundamental principles of the Constitution of the
fifth French Republic is the principle of LaYcite,97 a system of public order
which ensures the separation of state and church; 'through which religion
gradually loses its influence on the individual and society' .'iX
The principle of Lai'cite is deeply rooted in French Republican
philosophy, and is the product of bitter State-Church conflict, which has
marred French history for centuries.99 France has a tradition of religious
hostility, which derives from the enormous influence the Catholic Church
once had over public and political matters. IOO
Consequently, French republicanism has adopted a strong, arguably
militant,101 secularist attitude, ensuring that personal religious beliefs do
not extend past the private realm into the 'laique republic'.102
Under the constitution, the current Republic is 'one and
indivisible' .103 As a matter of official policy citizens are encouraged to
belong to the French national community, rather than a particular racial,
ethnic or religious community. The population must be unified to
95 Polls have shown that 86 percent of the French population supported the education minister's decree which
clTectively banned Hijabs from classrooms; http://www.themodernreligion.com/woman/Hijab-world.htm. whilst
approximately 70% supported the eventual law introduced by President Chirae in 2004 (considered later in this
paper); W Cederwell,' What They Said about. .. The French Ban on Hijabs', The Guardian, 6 February 2004.
96 The position of the Hijab, and even Islam, in modern secular Turkey has been the subject of fierce debate lor
many decades: Benjamin D. Bleiberg, Cornell Law Review, 2005, op. cit., Vol. I :129, Vol. 1:129.
97 The French adaptation of secularism described as; "the French understanding ofthe propcr place and
function of religion within the state": 0 Dord, Larcite: Ie modetefranr,:ais sous influence europeenne (Paris,
Fondation Robert Schuman, 2004),14-35.
98 R Dericquebourg, 'From the MILS to the MIVILUDES: France's Sect Policy atter the Fall of the Socialist
Government', Human Rights -Without Frontiers International; http://www.hnvfnet. October 2003.
99 AH Galton, Church and State in France 1300-1870 (London, Edward Arnold, 19(7)
100 C Caldwell, 'Veiled Threat: Can French Secularism Survive Islam'?' The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2004.
101 Insofar as French Republicanism can be defined as a 'secular religion'; J Bauberot, 'Secularism and French
Religious Liberty: a Sociological and Historical View', (2003) 2 Brigham Young University Law Review, 451-
64,454.
102 Article I of the Constitution of 1946 (fourth French Republic).
103 The Situation olMuslims in France. in Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Alimony Proration (New
York. The Open Society Institute, 2002) 71 www.eumap.org/reports/2002 leu linternational Isections/franee
12002_france.pdf
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harmonise and conform with the state, both legally and socially. A
consequence of such a philosophy is that there is no 'right to be
diflerent',11I4 thus France does not recognise minority groups. 105
Therefore, France employs a 'strongly integrationist and
assimilationist '10" approach to minorities, in stark contrast with the British
tradition of recognising cultural and religious differences. l07
Multiculturalism, is 'un-French ',IOX and the French commitment to its
assimilationist approach is evidenced by its refusal to become a party to
various international treaties, which recognise minority rights. l09
Thus, along with its political traditions, and having the largest
Muslim population among Western European states,IIO the noticeable
emergence of a minority group openly expressing their religious identity
was arguably bound to be considered conflicting and controversial in
France, and more so than in other European states.
2.2.2 Hijab Debate in Criel
In France, the wearing of the Hijab had been the cause of a heated
public debate for more than fifteen years lll since, in 1989, three pupils
were excluded from a public middle school for wearing the Hijab. llc
Although the situation was resolved, the events at the College Gabriel
Havez in Criel attracted much publicity and sparked a national debate. l13
The debate considered a wide range of factors other than religious rights,
104 U Lochak, "La com/ilion des mintJri/(!s en France. Les mhlOrites et it droit public Fram;ais: du r¢jils des
differences a la gestion des di/jerences"', in A Fenet and G- Souher. Minorites et leurs droits depuis 1789 (Paris.
L'Harmattan, ]YXY) I 14-2X.
105 'Third periodic report of France' under the ]CCPR (15 May 1997), UN Doc CCPR/C176/Add 7, para 394.
]06 A Favell, Philosophies of!nlegration: Immigration and the Idea afCilizenship in France and Britain, 2nd
edn (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2(01) 40-62.
]07 S Poulter,' Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France' 17 OJLS
(1997)43-74,74.
lOR J Jennings, ' Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France' 30 British Journal
ojPnlilical Science (2000) 575-9X, 57X.
JOY For example, The Council of Europe's Framework Convention on National Minorities (1994), the European
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and Convention 169 Of the Intemational Labour
Organisation (lLO) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989).
] 10 J House,' Muslim communities in France' in G Nonneman, T Nib]ock and B Szajkowki (eds), Muslim
Communities in the new Europe (Reading, PA, Ithaca, 1997).
] 1] C Laborde,' On Republican Toleration', (2002) 9 Constellations, ]67-83.
] 12 F Gaspard and F Khosrokhavar, Lefimlard et la republique (Paris, La Decouverte, ]995).
] ]3 Many political parties were split on their views; whilst the National Front argued that the Hijab was a threat
to France, and that immigrants should respect French cultural traditions or leave, some centrist politicians shared
the view of the potential threat and agreed that a shared nationa] culture was required for socia] integration, but
also focused on the needs for common rules regarding the manifestation of religious beliefs. Meanwhile, some
of the Socialist party felt that Islamic fundamentalism was incompatible with the freedom of conscience and
secularism; Dominic McGo]drick (2006), op cit, p 67-6X.
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such as secularism, equality of women, difference, immigration and the
fear of Islamic fundamentalism. I 14
It is submitted that at best this debate was misdirected, and at worse
prejudiced. From looking at the cause of the debate, the key issues to be
addressed were the compatibility of the principle of Lai"cite with the
religious rights of Muslim women. However, although one of the factors
considered was the equality of women, this is seen by some as a great
contradiction, as the debate was 'monopolised by men './/5
Furthermore, there were strong factors which were inappropriate and
irrelevant to the debate, which however proved very influential.
For example, although the wearing of the Hijab by Muslim women
in France had caused no concern of militant Islamic fundamentalism, it is
clear that many opinions were influenced with the increase in Islamic
fundamentalism in a number of non-European states in the 1980s,
particularly in Iran. 116 Indeed, events in 1989 prior to the expulsion of the
three girls were clearly influential, even before the national debate. In
1989 political Islam entered the international stage: Ayatollah Khomeini's
much-publicised fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the civil war in Lebanon
and the political movement of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) was born
in Algiers.
The reference to International Islamic fundamentalism and
especially to the Salman Rushdie affair I 17 should not have been relevant to
the eriel debate. Previous to these international events, many veiled girls
had been attending the same school as well as other schools, without any
objections. I IS However, through the media coverage of the international
events, which illustrated 'political Islam' in the form of Iranian women in
Islamic dress, the Hijab was given a new dimension. 119
Thus, it can be seen that many of the factors which led up to the
debate were part of a different and wider debate, but nonetheless
influential. Also, many of the issues referred to in the public debate, such
as Islamic fundamentalism in Middle Eastern states, were irrelevant to the
central issue, and could have negatively influenced public opinion.
114 Ibid, P 67
lIS C Killian, 2003, op cit, 568,
116 Dominic McGoldrick, Human rights and religion, The Islamic headscar(dehate in Europe (Hart, 2(06), p
65, Iran, as a result of the Islamic revolution of 1979, is under a strict Islamic regime: the rights of women are
severely restricted and it is compulsory by law for all females above the age of six, regardless of religion, to
wear the Hijab: H Omid, Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State (London, Macmillan, 1994), p 178-204,
117 A British Muslim whose book called The Satanic Verses which created a furore amongst Muslims
worldwide, and the reason why he became the subject of a fatwa calling for his death,
118 Temoignage Chretien, October 3D-November 5,1989.
119 John R Princeton, Why the French don't like heads'carves: Islam, the state and public ,space, ( NJ :
Princeton University Press, 2(07), p 83.
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However, referring to acts of terrorism or militant Islamic ideology within
the same debate could have had the impact of stigmatising the plight of the
Muslim women in the debate, by implying that they or the Muslim veil
were connected to radical Islamic Ideology.
The majority of public opinion subsequently opposed the wearing of
the veil and generally supported the principle of secularism. 120
Nonetheless, the French Minister of Education at that time chose a
controversial but tolerant solution. It was based on a more forgiving
interpretation of Lai"cite. He believed that students who wore the veil
should be permitted to attend school, as denying them this would rule out
any possible integration and limit their social mobility.121
To support his assertion, which attracted fierce criticism,122 he sought
the opinion from the Conseil d'Etat, the highest state administrative
authority, regarding the compatibility of wearing religious symbols with
the principle of Lai"cite. The Conseil d'Etat not only considered the Law
of Separation and Article I of the 1958 Constitution (in which the principle
of Lai"cite is enshrined) but also relevant international human rights
treaties, including the ECHR and the ICCPRI23 to which France is a party,
and is thus bound by them. The Conseil d'Etat was of the opinion that:
The wearing of signs by which they intend to demonstrate their
belonging to a religion is not in itself incompatible with the
principle of secularism, in so far as it constitutes the exercise of
that freedom of expression and a demonstration of religious
belief. 124
However it also advocated what the limitations on the exercise of these
rights ought to be:
... that freedom does not permit students to display signs of
religious belonging which ... by the conditions in which they are
worn ...would constitute an act of pressure, provocation,
proselytism or propaganda. 125
120 Dominic McGoldrick, Human rights and religion, The Islamic head,,:arldehale in Europe (Hart (2006), p
68.
121 Journal Officiel, 25 October 1989, 113-15; Le Monde, 26 October 1989.
122 Five French philosophers published an open leller to the Minister of education urging teachers to disobey
his instructions and F Gaspard and F Khosrokhavar, LejiJulard ella republique, Paris, La Deco uverte. 199522-
9.
123 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force March 23,1976.
124 Avis (opinion) no 346.893 du 27 Novembre 1989.
125 Avis (opinion) no 346.893 du 27 Novemhre 1989.
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A careful analysis of this significant declaration shows that the
Conseil d'Etat was of the opinion that, where a member of a religious
community wears a religious symbol purely as a sign or symbol to
demonstrate their belonging to a religion, in the exercise or manifestation
of a belief, in the absence of any improper intention or purpose such as
provocation or coercion, this will be compatible not only with secularism
but also with the principle of Lai"cite. 126
There is also a strong correlation between the limitations thought
necessary by the Conseil d'Etat on religious freedoms, and those provided
by Article 9 (2) of the ECHR and Article 18 (3) of the lCCPR, namely
public safety, public order, health or morals, and for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. 127 This seems to suggest that not only did the
Conseil d'Etat feel satisfied with the amount of reI igious freedom afforded
by the ECHR and the ICCPR but also with the grounds of limitations. This
provides support to the argument that a law or measure providing an
absolute prohibition on the wearing of religious symbols is
disproportionate, as effective protection is already provided by the treaties.
In any event, the Conseil d'Etat was advancing a contemporary reading of
Lai"cite. 128
Accordingly, a large majority of school decisions to exclude or
suspend pupils were reversed by the Conseil d'Etat (41 school decisions
were reversed out of 49). It is clear from the cases l2 '! that regulations
which enforced a general blanket ban on the wearing of Hijabs were
annulled, having been found to breach the students' rights of expression
and the principles of neutrality and secularism in public education. This
again appears to illustrate the opinion of the Conseil d'Etat, that the
wearing of religious symbols in a context which did not include
provocation or any other improper conduct was permissible in a public
school in a secular state. 130
126 It has been argued that the common English translation of secularism only partly relleets the meaning of
Lareite; M Troper,' Frcneh Secularism. or Larcite (2000) 21 Cardozo Law Review. I267-X4.
127 The Convention (Article 9.2) provides a ncar identical list of limitations to the Covenant, with the only
difference being that the Convention states as a limitation the protection oflhe rights and lreedoms of others as
opposed to the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, as provided by lhe Covenant (Article IX.3).
12X ET Beller,' The HeadscarfAtTair: The Conseil d'Etat on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society'
(2004) 39(4) Texas In/ernationa! Law Joarna!, 581-623.
129 Conseil d'Etat, 2 November 1992, No 130.394 (Kehroua, Kachour, Balo, Kizic).
130 The cases of Moussaoui 1't a! (Conseil d'Etat, 27 November 1996, No 1702(7), and Aouki!i (Conseil d·Etat.
10 March 1995. No 159.981), illustrate this point where the Conseil d'Etat upheld restrictions where the Hijab
has worn with the intention of creating provocation. proselytism or disruption to public order.
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2.2.3 French Ban on Religious Symbols in 2003
The public perception of foreign people and culture can be heavily
dependent on the modern mass media, which, through the repetition of
carefully selected pictures and words such as Islamic fundamentalism, and
the omission of appropriate and proper information, can help create and
distribute stereotypical images. lJI
In France, following the debate in Criel in 1989, an analysis of
media coverage shows that the mass media was biased and misleading in
how it reported articles which were related to the debate. The media
attempted to link incidents such as the Rushdie affair to the expulsion of
the three girls. It also - in its selection of images - would associate
fundamentalism and fanaticism with religious apparel. On October 5th the
Le Nouvel Observateur ran a cover story entitled 'Fanaticism: The
Religious Menace' with the image of a girl in a full, black chador,132 an
exaggeration of what the three girls expelled had been wearing.]]] This
symbolism given of the Hijab permits only one perception: that it is a
symbol of militant fanaticism and fundamentalism, an oppressive
prescription imposed onto women, who adopt it involuntarily.
Although through mediation and negotiation the number of disputes
was reduced, the media focus and attention did not follow suit. 134 This
focus intensified when, on September 11 th 2001, nineteen members of a
radical Islamic terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda, carried out a suicide attack
using hijacked planes on the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon. It was the largest terrorist attack ever recorded, with over 3,000
fatalities, more than 10 times the number of fatalities caused from any
previous terrorist attack. 135
Although Muslim leaders, scholars, royalty, Imams and supreme
spiritual leaders (Ayatollahs) worldwide united to condemn the attacks,1J6
the irreparable damage had been done to the perception of Muslims. As
131 "Media Stereotyping: Images of the Foreigner" In Gary Gumpert and Robert Cathcart, Mass
Communications and Cuburalldentity, Conference of the International Association for Media and
CommunicatIOn Research, 199~, 500-520.
132 A long black cloak worn commonly by Iranian women in public, which covers from head to ankle.
133 Other feature stories from L 'Express include 'The Secular School in Danger: the Strategy of
Fundamentalists' (26th of October 1989) and 'Foulard (veil), the Plot: How the Islamist Infiltrate Us'( 17th of
November 1994).
134 In the IO-year period f(lllowing the initial public debate in France, over 1500 press articles were written on
religion in schools, in the UK and France, with the majority of these based on the headscarves: 'Lina Liederman,
Pluralism In Education: The Display of Islamic Aniliation in French and British Schools', (2000) Islam and
Christian Muslim Relations, 110-12.
135 Ariel Merari, "Social, Organisational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism", pi, published in
Root Causes o(Terrorism, edited by Tore Bj0rgo (Routledge, 20(5), p 70-3.
136 http://www.islamonline.net/englishINewsI200 1-09/13/article 14.shtml .
43
before, the actions of a few alleged Muslims brought shame to the
international Islamic community, and a heightened sense of fear of the
religion. The world reacted in panic and fear, which then transformed into
paranoia and contempt.
Regardless of the fact that the majority of Muslims worldwide
condemned the attacks,137 anything or anyone perceived l38 to be associated
with Islam came under assault. 139 A consequence of this was increased
focus on the veil dispute, which was now viewed in an even-more negative
light. 140 Following the attacks, stories which portrayed the topic of the
Islamic threat began to be regularly cycled repetitively across the covers of
L 'Express, Le Point, /4/ or Le Nouvel Observateur, to attract readers who
were already alarmed.
The Hijab debate arose again in France, and reached its pinnacle
when in December 2003, Jacques Chirac, the French president, proposed a
law banning Hijabs from public schools. Although he primarily claimed
that this was necessary for the defence of the republic's 'secular values',142
it is clear that other factors were influential.
Chirae's concern about 'obscurantism and fanaticism ...gaining
ground in the world' 143 hinted that he was not only aware of recent terrorist
incidents such as 9/11, but also found them relevant and possibly
influential in formulating his proposals. Furthermore, political critics have
suggested that the real motivation of President Chirac's speech could have
been his government's declining popularity, and the increasing popularity
of both left and right extremism, who both view Islam as a threat to
Christian France or its secular traditions. 144
The President's speech followed the publication of a report'45 he
commissioned, from the Commission de Reflexion sur I'application du
principe de la LaYcite dans la Republique of the French Assembly on 11 th
137 A huge survey of the world's Muslims released conducted over six years and three continents, ofa sample
equivalent to 90 percent of the world's Muslims found that the overwhelming majority of Muslims condemned
the 9111 terrorist attacks; http://afp.google.com/artic1e/ALeqM5iZlsZRgzHmgwj6sKpA7PR5F5Fcsw.
138 Somc of the victims ofthe September II backlash, included four men of Afghan, Bangladeshi, Indian and
Pakistani origin; http://www.sikhtimes.com/news_093002a.html.
139 Summary Report on Islamophobia In the EU atter II September 200 I. European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). May 2002; The report's lindings show that Islamic communities and other
vulnerable groups became targets of increased hostility since I I September in many European Member States.
140 Bowen, John R Princeton, NJ, (2007) op cit, P 93.
141 It is interesting to note that the editorial writer for Le Point, Claude Imbert, has openly admitting being "an
Islamaphobe"; Lei, 24 October 2003, Acrimed.samizdat.net.
142 Speech by Jacques Chirac, president of the French Republic, Paris, the 17th of December 2003;
http://www.elysee.lr
143 Ibid.
144 A Taheri, Chirac Has Lost His Political Head over Schoolgirls in Scarves, The Times, 3rd february 2004.
145 http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancai se. Ir/BRP1034000725/0000.pd I'
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December 2003 (commonly known as the Stasi Commission). Following
its extensive consultations,146 one of the Stasi Commission's most
prominent recommendations was a prohibition of ostentatious religious
symbols in schools. This was following its finding that a clear majority of
Muslim girls did not want to wear the Hijab. 147
However, it is submitted that the accuracy and credibility of the
report is questionable. 14s For example, out of the 140 people invited to give
evidence to the Commission only one was invited who wore the Hijab;
interestingly some members of the Commission were angered by the fact
that she brought another veiled woman with her. 149 The failure to consult
the views of more Muslim women (especially veiled), who would be the
most affected by a ban on the Hijab, is irresponsible and heavily
criticised,150 and the exclusion of Muslim women from the debate is
reminiscent of the previous debate in the 1980s.1 51
Nevertheless, the measure received huge support in the French
National Assembly, and the legislation was passed by the Senate, also by
an overwhelming majority, and was promulgated on the 21st of March
2004. 152 According to opinion polls 153 the new law l54 received 70 percent of
the support of French people. However, the law received harsh criticism
from significant commentators, such as the Pope and three of the leading
international human rights non-governmental organisations: Human Rights
Watch,155 the Minority Rights Group l56 and the International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights. 157
146 The commission in producing the report held four months of public hearings, and a public discussion with
over 400 students from various countries and heard from a broad range of groups and individuals, such as
religious committees, religious representatives, State agencies, non-governmental organisations, trade unionists,
company executives, doctors, higher education institutions, teachers and schools; P Weil (member of the Stasi
Commission), 'A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims and the Headscarf ; http://www.opendemocracy.net.
147 P Weil (member of the Stasi Commission), A Nation in Diversitv: France. Muslims and the Headscar/;
http://www.opendemocracy.nct.
148 The impartiality of some of the members of the Stasi Commission can also be questioned, with some
members having expressly declared their support of an absolute prohibition on all religious symbols, before
joining the Commission, and maintaining that position throughout the commissioning of the report; Bowen,
John R Princeton, 2007 op. cit. Page 258 .
149 Bowen, John R Princeton, NJ, (2007), op cit, P 118.
ISO M. M. Idris, 'LaIcite and the Banning of the "hijab" in France', 25 (2) Legal Studies (2005) 260-95, 294.
151 C Killian, 2003 op cit, P 68.
152 For the legislative dossier see: http://www.senat.fr/dossierig/pj103-209.html
153 W Cederwell,' What They Said about. .. The French Ban on Hijabs' The Guardian, 6 February 2004.
154 Loi No 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 Journal Ofj/ciel No 65.
155 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/26/france7666.htm
156 http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid~ 1673
157 IHFR, A French Ban on Religious Symbols Would Violate International Protections ofFreedom of
Religion, 17 December 2003 ; http://www.ihfr-hLorg/viewbinary/viewbinary/viewhtml.php?doc_id~5259
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2.2.4 Persuasive Influence on other States
Nonetheless, and more disturbingly, the measures taken in France,
which human rights advocates have described as 'an unwanted
infringement ',158 have influenced other states: whilst Turkey and
Uzbekistan are using the French ban to support their secular approach,159
Belgium attempted to adopt a similar law,160 which would ban the wearing
of all religious symbols in all public places, including public hospitals.1 61
The draft resolution considered by the Belgian Senate can be seen as an
extension of the French law as the scope of its application went further
than the school gates.
Furthermore, other European states,162 especially after the attacks on
the World Trade Centre, are having the same debate regarding the
acceptability of the Hijab (and Islam) in their societies, and it is possible
that they will also look towards France, as a model for human rights
protection,163 when considering their options. 1M For example, it has given
support to the argument made that the current UK commitment to
multiculturalism is unwise. 165 Thus, there are wider implications of the
French law on human rights, and specifically on religious freedoms.
2.2.5 Possible Relief from the ECtHR
Those who feel aggrieved by such measures, or that their rights as
guaranteed under the Convention have been violated, may look to the
ECtHR for relief. Although, the vice president of the ECtH R was reported
15g Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch;
Http://www.religiousfreedom.com/nwslttr/headscarves.htm
159 B G6kariksel and K Mitchell, 'Veiling, Secularism, and the Neoliberal Subject: National Narratives and
Supranational Desires in Turkey and France' (2005) 5 Global Networks, 147-65, 157; Uzbekistan Class
Dismissed: Discriminatory Expulsions of Muslim Students
<http://www.hnv.org/reports/1999/uzbekistan/index.htm#p42.754.
160 'Belgium Considers school HeadscarfBan', The Guardian (Education section), 12 January 2004.
161 2004 Annual Report on Human Rights in Belgium,' Human Rights Without Frontiers; www.hrvvforg
162 J Henley, The Guardian, 4 February 2004.
163 "France has been a model to the rest of the world, the land of the rights of man ... 01' individual liberty, a
nation destined to spread the bcnetlts of civilisation across its national borders and beyond ... to ... the wider
world"; J. Jennings, , Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France', (2000) 30
Bri/ish Journal of'?olitical Science, 575-9g, 5n.
164 For example, commentators in Macedonia have expressed interest in adopting the French modell'or dealing
with interfaith relations, religious freedom and non-discrimination; M Najcevska, E Simoska and N Gaber,
'Muslims, State and Society in the Republic of Macedonia: The View From Within' in G Nonneman, T Niblock
and B Szajkowki (eds), Muslim Communities in the new Europe (Reading, PA, Ithaca, 1'1'(7),75-97.
165 Tom Lewis, 'What not to wear: religious rights, the European Court, and the margin of appreciation' ICLQ,
2007,
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to have suggested that a law prohibiting religious signs in schools would
not breach the European Convention on Human Rights,166 the actual
response and application of the ECHR to the current scenario is uncertain.
This is because, as the law was only recently introduced, those aggrieved
by it are still working through the hierarchy of national courts, exhausting
domestic remedies, before they can apply to the ECtHR. 167
For example, UNITED SIKHS I16H lawyers announced on the 11th of
June 2007 that they filed a legal challenge to the French law before the
ECtHR, which it claims will be the first such case against France since it
passed the law banning the wearing of religious symbols, including the
Sikh turban, in public schools. 169
The author aims to contend that the basis for the legislation in
France is unfounded, and is disproportionate in any event to the alleged
aims relied upon. Therefore, it is argued that, in an application before the
European Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR should find the French law
constitutes a breach of the ECHR.
Before we analyse the key elements of reasoning which make up the
purported aims of the legislation, which France would use to justify such a
prohibition, we must consider the relevant cases which have raised similar
issues. By doing so one can assess the scope of protection afforded to the
applicants under the ECHR, and equally what limitations a respondent
State would try to invoke.
The assessment of the facts and findings of these cases will help to
predict the ECtHR's likely approach to an application made such as
UNITED SIKHS; as we can see how the ECtHR interpreted the scope of
the freedoms set out, as well as under which circumstances the ECtHR
found it necessary to introduce measures to restrict these freedoms, and on
what grounds it judged the proportional ity of these measures.
3. Jurisprudence ofthe ECtHR under Article 9
3.1 The Court's Interpretation of Article 9
Once an application falls within the positive formulation of a right or
freedom, the burden passes to the HCP to prove that the interference was
valid. Under Article 9(2), a restriction or limitation of the rights to
166 During the public hearings or the Stasi commission; Stasi Report. para 2.1.
167 Article 35 European Convention on Human Rights.
l6X UNITED SIKHS is an international non-profit, non-governmental, humanitarian reliet~ human development
and advocacy organization; http://www.unitedsikhs.org/.
I69 http://www.unitedsikhs.org/PressReleases/PRSRLS-11-06-2007-00.htm
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freedom of thought, conscience and religion will only be compatible with
the ECHR, if they are: (1) prescribed by law,170 (2) in pursuance of a
legitimate aim;171 and (3) necessary in a democratic society.
The test of necessity has been found to imply a high burden on the
state, to prevent arbitrary interferences in a fundamental freedom or right.
Necessity is 'not synonymous with "indispensable", neither has it the
flexibility of such expressions as "admissible", "ordinary", "useful",
"reasonable" or "desirable"'. 172
It has been held that any interference must be to satisfy a 'pressing
social need'17] and be 'proportionate' to the grounds of restrictions, which
are to be interpreted narrowly.174 Furthermore, another condition was laid
out in Litwa v Poland;175 it must not only be a proportionate response to a
matter of urgent social need, but the state must show that, in seeking to
achieve the legitimate aim, the measure implemented exerted the least
interference with the applicant's rights. Thus, the doctrine of
proportionality and necessity are vital in maintaining that the rights and
freedoms afforded by the ECHR are only restricted in appropriate
circumstances.
Another jurisprudential doctrine of the ECtHR, the margin of
appreciation,176 gives the ECHR a degree of flexibility to allow efficient
operation throughout the HCPs, in the absence of a "uniform European
conception" on delicate and subjective issues such as morals and
religion. 177 The ECtHR uses the doctrine in 'searching for a fair balance178
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the
protection of the individual's fundamental rights'.179
170 This standard requires that "the law in question must be both adequately accessible to the individual and
formulated with sufficient precision to enable him to regulate his conduct"; Larissis and Others v. Greece,
judgment of24 February 1998,27 EHRR 329 at para 44.
171 The legitimate aims under Article 9.2 are in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
172 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 24 Eur Court HR (ser A) 5, 22; I EHRR 737, 754.
173 Silver v United Kingdom EHRR 347 (1983).
174 Klass v Germany Series A No 28, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214, ECtHR.
175 Witold Litwo v Poland [2000j ECHR 141.
176 The first application of the doctrine was in Greece v United Kingdom (195R-59) ,Y BElir Conv on H R 174
(Commission), However, the phrase 'discretion' was used instead of margin of appreciation, which was lirst
used in Lawless v. Ireland (1979-80) I EHRR I (Commission).
177 "As in the case of' morals' ... it is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the
significance of religion in society"; Ot!o-Preminger Institllte v. Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34, 57-58.
178 The ECtH R has held that in this balance particular importance should he attached to the protection of
fundamental human rights; Belgian Linguistic judgement of23rd July 1968, ECHR, Series A, no. 6, p.32,
para 5.
179 Brogan and Others, judgement of29 November 1988, ECHR, Series A, no. 145 b. pp. 44-45 (dissenting
opinion ofjudge Evans).
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The doctrine is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity: the
recognition that the Strasbourg organs must remain complementary and
subsidiarylXO to the competent national authorities, IXI who must be allowed
a degree of discretion in pursuance of their obligations under the ECHR IX2.
The degree, however, varies greatly, and arguably undennines concepts
such as necessity and proportionalitY,183 as a HCP may be given discretion
itself to judge whether a restriction is necessary. Nonetheless, the margin
is not 'unchallengeable' 184 and 'goes hand-in-hand with...European
supervision', empowering the ECtHR to review the aim and necessity of
the measure challenged, to conclude if it is compatible with the ECHR. 185
The ECtHR in reviewing an application under Article 9 has a
difficult task to undertake. Article 9 is arguably one of the vaguest Articles
of the ECHR, with no clear consensus throughout Europe or in the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on what the actual freedom entails. 186
Furthermore, as 'throughout Europe a uniform conception of the
significance of religion in society"187 cannot be established, the ECtHR
adopts a highly deferential approach. This is detrimental to individual
applicants, who, owing to the lack of certainty and European supervision,
are given far less protection than applicants who claim under the other
personal freedom articles. lss
We will now look at the first of two cases regarding the provisions
on Hijabs, to analyse how the ECtHR has interpreted and applied Article 9
of the ECHR, along with the margin of appreciation doctrine. This early
case, one of few in the jurisprudence regarding Article 9 and religious
clothing, illustrated the same biased and stereotypical views by the
1XO On the subsidiary nature of the EClIR. see Herbert Petzold, "The Convention and the Principle of
Subsidiarity", in R St J Macdonald. F Matseher and H Petzold (eds.), The European System For The Protection
O/Human Rights 41 (1993).
IXI " Lly reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital tllrees of their countries, state authorities
are in principle in a beller position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements as well as on the '''necessity'' ofa "restriction" or "penalty": Handyside v. Linited Kingdom, App
No 5493/72, at para 4X (Dec 7,1976).
1X2 T. A. O'Donnell, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence ofthe European
Court of Human Rights", (19X2) 4 Human Rights Quarterlv, 474 at 496.
IX3 "The Court now appears to use the margin of appreciation as a substitute for coherent legal analysis ofthe
issues at stake":Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, The ECHR in the New Architecture of Europe: General Report,
In Proceedings of The Xth International Colloquy On The European Convention on Human Rights 227 (1995).
IX4 F. Ost," The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights", in M. Delmas-
Marty (ed.), The European Convention/i,r the Protection ofHuman Rights: International Protection Versus
National Restric/ions (1992), pp 2X3-341, at p 332.
1X5 Ilandyside 1'. United Kingdom, App No 5493/72 (Dec 7, 1976), pp 21-23, para 47-50.
I X6 Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, 200 I) P 18.
IX7 O({o-Preminger Institute v. Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34, 57-58.
188 Articles X-II. See Tom Lewis, ICLQ (2007), op cit, at 395. Lewis argues that the court is "guilty of
disparity of treatment".
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ECtHR, as the proponents of prohibitions against religious clothing in the
public sphere.
3.2 Dahlah v Switzerland lx9
In Dahlab, a primary school teacher began to wear the Hijab after
converting to Islam. She was able to wear the Hijab for over five years
without any complaints or concerns from her colleagues, her pupils or
their parents. She conducted herself in a very professional manner
throughout, ensuring that her private religious beliefs were not imposed on
anyone. 19]) Unfortunately, following an inspection, the Director General of
Public Education was informed that she was wearing a Hijab. The Director
General, after attempted mediation, issued a direction prohibiting her from
wearing the Hijab when teaching. Subsequently Ms Dahlab's challenge to
the decision failed in the Swiss courtS.I'!1
Furthermore, the application to the European Court also failed, the
ECtHR agreeing with Switzerland that the case was so manifestly ill-
founded that it did not deserve to proceed to the merits phase. I')" In
Switzerland teachers are considered to be public servants and, thus,
representatives of the state. There may be a stronger justification to
prohibit civil or public servants from wearing religious symbols in a
secular state, compared with students in public schools. It is arguable that,
in attempting to keep the state neutral, they must not visibly express their
allegiance to a particular religious belief, as they are embodied or
envisaged as representatives of the state. I'!] Consequently, the European
Court's ruling in Dahlab will not be questioned or challenged herein.
However, the significance and relevance of the Dahlab case in this
paper is the procedural requirements from which the ECtHR should arrive
at such a decision. The respondent state based its argument on the
principles of secularism, religious neutrality and gender equality: the
wearing of the Hijab could harbour a proselytising effect, and indicated
allegiance to a particular faith, in breach of the principle of denominational
1X9 Dahlab "Switzerland, ECHR 20(lI -V 449.
190 Going as far as answering pupils who asked, that the Hijab she wore to keep her ears warm; Dahlab ,.
Switzerland, Application No 42393/98, ECHR 20(lI-V, 449 at 456.
191 Xc Conseil d'Etat du cantun de Geneve (1997) BGE 123 I 296, 312; Dahlab " Switzerland, ECII R 2001-
V,449,451-2.
192 Dahlab "SWitzerland, ECHR 2001-V 449, 456-457.
193 However, Raja EI Elhabt; (Director or Research of Karamah, The Muslim Women Lawyers for Human
Rights Group) argues that the principle or neutrality in public schools applies only to teachers not students;
http;llpcwtorum.org/events/index.php"Event 1D~55.
50
neutrality, which sought to protect the religious beliefs of pupils and
parents, and to ensure religious harmony. 194
One of the applicant's complaints was that the decision did not have
a sufficient basis in law. This is significant in the case, as the applicant
illustrated the extreme difficulty in continuing her profession, as within the
Canton of Geneva the state schools had a virtual monopoly on infant
classes, I')) the few schools that remained were faith schools, governed by
religious authorities other than her own.
The legislation which the Swiss Federal Court held as satisfying the
requirement that the measure was prescribed by law was found in the
Cantonal Public Education Act of 6th November 1940196 and Article 27 &
3 of the Federal Constitution of 29th May 1874. 197
The applicant further contended that the measure failed to pursue a
legitimate aim, an argument supported by the fact that the respondent state
could not specify an appropriate legitimate aim under Article 9.2. Instead
in the Federal Court, the principle of denominational neutrality in schools
was citedl'JX as a sufficient ground of public interest for prohibiting the
applicant from wearing the Hijab. Nonetheless, the respondent State failed
to illustrate convincingly how the impugned measure was in the public
interest. The ECtHR, however, noticing this important omission, decided
themselves that the legitimate aims pursued were 'the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others, public safety and public order' .199
The last requirement, which needed to be satisfied before the ECtHR
could find that the measure was a legitimate restriction, was whether the
measure was 'necessary in a democratic society'. This is arguably one of
the most important factors in distinguishing between a violation and
legitimate interference. Notwithstanding that it is the last hurdle for a state
to clear in claiming a valid interference; it is also one of the most
subjective criteria which may be subjected to the greatest scrutiny.
However, whilst many measures will have legitimate aims with a
basis in domestic law, it is more difficulfoO to prove that they are
194 Dahlah v Switzerland, ECHR 200 I, P 5.
195 The only age group the applicant was qualified to teach; Dahlah v Switzerland, ECHR 2001, P II.
196 "The puhlic education system shall ensure that the political and religious beliefs of pupils and parents are
respected" (Section 6), and "Civil servants must be laypersons; derogations from this provision shall be
permitted only in respect of university teaching staft" (120 (2)).
197 "It shall be possible for members of all faiths to attend state schools without being affected in any way in
their freedom of conscience or belief".
198 Dahlah v Switzerland, ECHR 2001,4-5.
199 Dahlah v SWitzerland, ECHR 20(lI -Y, Page 14.
200 "The Strasbourg organs have very rarely found a violation of Convention rights" by reference to the
legitimate aim(s); Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence ofthc ECHR, Intersentia, (2002), page II.
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proportionate rather than relevant: necessary not only in the State interest,
but in a democratic society, to satisfy a 'pressing social need' ,201 rather
then mere general public interest. The onus is on the state to justify an
interference with a right guaranteed under the ECHR.202
The respondent state had previously argued that, in wearing religious
apparel, the applicant may have interfered with the religious beliefs of
pupils at the school, or their parents, despite the absence of any complaint,
of any kind from anyone/03 for over five years. 204 Furthermore, they argued
that the measure was proportionate, as the wearing of the Hijab was a
breach of the principle of denominational neutrality in schools, insofar as
state school teachers were representatives of the state and had to ensure the
neutrality of the state education.
As aforementioned, the ruling itself is not questioned; however, it is
the opinions and attitudes expressed by the ECtHR which are open to
criticism. In particular, the ECtHR's endorsement of the Federal Court's
views that the Hijab was a disparaging precept imposed solely on women,
and was incompatible with the principles of gender equality, tolerance,
respect for others and non-discrimination,205 was highly inappropriate and
unconventional. It is respectfully submitted that the European Court
should have condemned such discriminatory comments from the national
court, rather than approve them.
Although various radical interpretations of Islam can result in 'great
cruelty and injustice,'206 it was not the place of the ECtHR to consider such
matters, neither were they relevant, as there was no evidence to suggest
that the applicant wore the Hijab against her free will.
The failure of both the National and European Courts to subject
religious beliefs to scrutiny is evidenced from the fact that the precept
from the Quran is expressly imposed for chastity not oppression/o7 and the
requirements of chastity and modesty apply equally to both men and
women in Islam. 2osWhile Muslim men do not wear a Hijab, they do have a
201 Silver v United Kingdom EHRR 347 (1983)
202 As identified by the Court of Appeal; R. (on the application ajShahina Begum) v Head/eacher ond
Governors ofDenbigh High School [2005] EWCA Civ 199; [2005] I F.C.R. 530 at [761.
203 Including her colleagues, any pupils at the school or their parents.
204 Dahlab v Switzerland, ECHR 20()] -V, P 12.
205 Dahlab v Switzerland, ECHR 20()] -V, P 13.
206 Jamila Hussaio, Islam Its Law and Society, 2nd ed (The Federation Press. 2(04), p 154.
207 The author is attempting to make the point that the precept from the Koran may be interpreted to be non-
prejudiced. and although various radical interpretations and practices may exist, the Court only considered one
possible interpretation.
208 "Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and be modest and tell the believing women to lower their
gaze and be modest..." [Quran verses 24:30-31 (abridged)]; " the men and the women who guard their
chastity ... , Allaah has prepared fllr them forgiveness and a great reward." [Soorah AI-Ahzab 33:35];
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traditional dress which is also worn for modesty.209 Thus, it is difficult to
reconcile the fact that the ECtHR felt they were not best placed to assess
whether the measure in question was necessary, but felt it was proper to
criticise the religious beliefs held by millions of people.
Furthermore, the ruling by the ECtHR illustrates the degree of
discretion the ECtHR was prepared to give to a HCP, in cases which
involved religion. [t is an example of the ECtHR's reluctance to give
applicants under Article 9 sufficient protection afforded by the ECHR,
which has been the basis for the criticism of subsequent cases. 21O Allowing
a wide margin of appreciation on the requirement of necessity, without the
essentiaF
"
assessment of the arguments afforded by the state in support of
a pressing social need, may undermine the doctrines of necessity,
proportionality and even the margin of appreciation, which requires
'European supervision'.
[n a more recent case,212 the Court of Appeal in the UK have held
that such an exercise of scrutiny should be undertaken, regardless of
whether the same conclusion may justifiably be reached. This decision by
a national court highlights the fundamental importance of the (correct)
approach which a state must take in justifying interference. It is submitted
that such a robust approach should be consistently taken by the ECtHR,
even in straightforward cases. This is so, as failing to do so may
jeopardise the chances of later applicants, whose application may be
treated in a similar way, although the facts are greatly distinguishable. In
terms of precedent, failing to take a strict approach in cases which involve
religious clothing may imply to HCPs that the ECtHR interprets a lower
scope of protection for Article 9 compared with the other personal freedom
Articles,2IJ or even Article 9 cases which do not involve religious
clothing. 214
This can create a more far-reaching impediment to personal
freedoms and rights than (it) prima facie appears. This is as such decisions
209 http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/hijab_5.shtml
210 A Geddis. 'You Can't Say "God" on the Radio: Freedom of Expression, Religious Advertising and the
Broadcast Media Aller Murphy v Ireland', (2004) 2 European Homan Rights Review, IRI-92; Application No
44774/9R, Leyla Sohin v Turkey, (Grand Chamber), para 9; Samantha Knights, European Human Rights Law
Review (2005), op cit, P 10.
21 I Samantha Knights, op cit, P R.
212 R. (on the application ofShahina Begum) v Headteacher and Governors ofDenhigh High Schoo! [2005]
EWCA Civ 199; 120051 I FCR 530.
213 Tom Lewis, op cit, at 395.
214 The courts highly deferential approach in Dahlah contrasts with its previous ruling in Kokkinakis v Greece
(1994) 17 EIfRR 397. In that case, which raised similar issues such as proselytism, the Court acknowledged the
certain margin of appreciation which Heps had, nonetheless it ruled that the applicant's active proselytism was
not only permitted hut protected under Article 9.
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may give the green light to other Contracting Parties under the ECHR to
enact similar laws, which may appear to only restrict religious expression,
but as a deeper consequence, 'discriminate against minority groups, deny
equal opportunities to women and potentially limit access to education'.215
The Dahlab case was one of the first cases concerning the suitability
of the Hijab in public schools. However, the applicant in this case was a
teacher. For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant and recent
authority one must consider is the Turkish case of Leyla Sahin.
3.3 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey
In February 1998 a fifth-year medical student, Leyla Sahin, fell foul
of a circular issued by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Istanbul, to
which she was admitted. The circular216 expressly prohibited the
admittance of students with head coverings to lectures, courses or
tutorials. 217 Leyla Sahin considered wearing her Hijab a religious
obligation/Ix and continued to defy the ban. As a result of this and of her
participation in an unauthorised protest against the ban in February 1999,
she was suspended. Her complaints to the Istanbul Administrative Court
and the Supreme Administrative Court were unsuccessful. 21 ')
Sahin then filed an application to the ECtHR,220 under various
Articles of the ECHR. She claimed that, in preventing her from
manifesting her religion by wearing the Hijab, the measure violated the
right her freedom of religion under Article 9. Furthermore, she claimed
that the ban also violated Article 14, combined with Article 9,221 as the
measure discriminated against students based on their religious beliefs,
forcing them to choose between their religion and education.
In a similar vein, she argued that she was deprived of the right to
education under Article 2 of Protocol NO.1 of the Convention/22 as, being
compelled to choose to remain committed to her religious beliefs, she had
215 Benjamin D. Bleiberg, (2005) 1 Cornell Law Review, 129, 132.
216 In compliance with section 13 of thc Higher Education Act
217 Lev/a Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para. 12 (Eur Ct HR .Iune 29,2004)
218 Lev/a Sahin v. Turkev. No. 44774/98, para. 10 (Eur Ct.HR .Iunc 29. 2(04)
219 Lev/a Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para. 15-16 (Eur. Ct. II.R. .Iune 29, 2(04)
220 She applied in .Iuly 1998, and the EClIR lin ally accepted hcr claim almost 4 years later; rev/a Sahin v.
Turkey, No 44774/98, para 1,6. (Eur. Ct. HK .Iune 29, 2(04).
221 Article 14 of the Convention; "The cnjoyment ofthc rights and freedoms set torth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
222 Protocol to the Convention lor the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, done Mar
20, 1952, Europ T S No 9; "No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any Illl1ctions
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, and the State shall respect the right of parents to
ensure such educatinn and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions."
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to sacrifice completing her studies.m Finally, she claimed that her rights
under Articles 8 and 10224 were also violated, as she was prevented from
expressing her beliefs.m
The ECtHR at first instance, sitting as a chamber of seven judges,
unanimously ruled in favour of Turkey in June 2004. Sahin's request for a
referral to the ECtHR's Grand Chamber was accepted, and a final decision
was pronounced on the 10th of November 2005. The Grand Chamber of
the ECtHR upheld the Court decision at first instance by 16 to I, and
found there was no violation of Article 9, Article 2 of Protocol I, Article 8,
Article 10 or Article 14. The Grand Chamber found, in relation to the
margin of appreciation that HCPs have in Article 9 cases that the measure
was proportionate to the legitimate aims that it pursued.226
The ECtHR first addressed Leyla Sahin's claim under Article 9,
which she alleged was violated by the measure restricting her from
manifesting her belief. Having aecepted that the regulation interfered with
her desire to practise her religion,227 the ECtHR then looked at whether the
measure satisfied the requirements of a legitimate interference under the
ECHR.
3.3.1 Was The Margin Afforded Too Wide?
The ECtHR gave particular consideration to the margm of
appreciation in formulating its ruling. However, the degree of
unsupervised deference has been heavily criticised.22X Whilst national
authorities may be best suited in assessing the necessity of interference,
the final decision should be that of the ECtHR, which should subject the
reasoning of the national state to proper scrutiny229 to see if it is compatible
with the ECHR. Although 'the role of the national decision-making body
must be given special importance',23o the ECtHR appeared to grant
unsupervised deference, allowing Turkey to conclude on its own what was
necessary, without considering the merits of the decision.
223/~ev/a Sahin v. Turkev, No 44774/n, para 116 (Eur Cl HR.June 29, 2(04).
224 Arlicle X( I): "Everyone has the right to respect f(Jr his private and hunily life, his home and his
correspondence." Article IO( I) : "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
rreedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless or Irontiers."
225/~ev/a Sahin v. Turkev, No 44774/9X, para. 116 (Eur Ct HRJune 29, 2(04)
226 Lev/a Sahin v. Turkev, No 44774/9X, para (lOur Ct fiR .Iune 29, 2(04) Grand Chamher para 112.
227 /~ey/a Sahin v. Turkey. No. 44774/n, para. 71 (Eur Cl HR.June 29,2(04)
22X Benjamin D. Bleiberg, "I' cit, vol. I: 129; Njal Hostmaelingen, Hijab, up cit; Tom Lewis. op cit, at 395.
Nicholas Gibson, OfJ cil.
229 Samantha Knights, op cit, p X.
230 Lev/a Sahin v. Turkel', No 44774/9X, para 101 (Eur Ct HR. June 29, 2(04).
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Furthermore, one of the important factors which the ECtHR
considered when affording a wide margin of appreciation was the absence
in its opinion of a European consensus on the matter. 2J1 However, in the
Grand Chamber the sole dissenting judge, Judge Tulkens, disagreed with
the majority. Judge Tulkens felt that, considering the practice throughout
the HCPs as the ECtHR did, a contrary conclusion should have been
reached. The ECtHR had observed that, apart from Turkey, only two
European states,2J2 Azerbaijan and Albania, had placed restrictions on the
Hijab at Universities. Thus, there was European consensus: that in the
majority of universities in Europe no restrictions are necessary and,
therefore, the ECtHR was wrong to allow such a wide margin of
appreciation on that basis.2JJ
Another reason in the ECtHR allowed a wide margin was because
Turkey argued that the prohibition was necessary to protect the principle
of secularism. This argument also failed to be thoroughly examined by the
ECtHR, and will be considered in the following section.
3.3.2 Valid Interference?
On the basis of the Turkish Higher Education Act and the various
national court rulings, the ECtHR easily established that the ban was
indeed prescribed by law, owing to its accessible nature and sufficiently
foreseeable effects. 234 The ECtHR also found that the prohibition
'primarily pursued' legitimate aims: protecting the rights of others and
public order. m
After considering the Hijab ban in the legal and social context of
Turkey, the ECtHR found that the ban was based on principles of
secularism and equality. It felt the ban was 'necessary in a democratic
society 0236 and proportionate, as overturning the ban would restrict
Turkey's ability to preserve the principles of secularism, the rights and
freedoms of others, maintenance of public order, state neutrality and
gender equality.237 The ECtHR gave specific weight in its judgment to the
principle of secularism in Turkey, which it found was 'one of the
231 Levla Sahin v. Turkev, No 44774/98, para 109 (Eur Ct HR. June 29, 2(04).
232 This was not only a review of HCPs but also member states.
233 Many academics are in agreement that the ECtHR should have ruled that there was a European consensus in
accordance with the view of judge Tulkens; 'Interview with Pro lessor Kevin Boyle' ,IIJ! cit; Nicholas Gibson,
up cit, p 12; Jill Marshall, op cit, P 2.
234 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para XI (Eur Ct HR June 29, 2(04).
235 Ibid, para 84.
236 Ibid., paras 114-15.
237 Ibid.. paras 104-10.
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fundamental principles of the state, in harmony with the rule of law and
respect for human rights'.23H In doing so, the ECtHR concluded that the
Turkish interpretation of secularism was 'consistent with the values
underpinning the Convention': thus, it was 'necessary for the protection of
a democratic system in Turkey'239 to uphold secularism.
Whilst recognising the historical importance of secularism to
Turkey, the ECtHR's review of Turkey's historical and social history has
been described as 'incomplete and unsophisticated'.240
The ECtHR did not adequately examine Turkeys' interpretation of
secularism, accepting immediately that it was 'in harmony with the rule of
law and human rights' .241 Following this concession, it essentially assumed
that any measure taken allegedly in the interest of maintaining secularism
must be in harmony with human rights. 242 Such an approach is flawed as
there is no one definition of secularism,24J as seen in Turkish history;
furthermore, that definition is subject to change and differing
interpretation.
However, the ECtHR examined or questioned neither the definition
of secularism that Turkey employed nor how the Hijab was incompatible
with such a definition. Such a consideration is particularly relevant as the
founding father of Turkish secularism was not opposed to the Hijab, and
did not find it incompatible with secularism.244 The ECtHR heavily relied
upon Turkey's commitment to upholding the principle of secularism in the
interests of human rights and democracy in its reasoning.
However, it can be argued that Turkey is neither secular nor a
democracy;245 since the coup in 1980 the undemocratically elected military
has been significantly involved in religious matters in the country. Islam in
Turkey has been subject to great state control, and treated as if 'it were a
state affair' .241, The government imposes its own version or interpretation
238 Ibid, para. 99.
239 Ibid, para. 106.
240 Benjamin D. Bleiberg, op cit., vol. I: 129, 149.
241 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98, para. 99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2(04).
242 Benjamin D. Bleiberg, op cit, vol. 1:129, 152.
243 See IngviIl Thorson Plesner,The European Court on Human Rights between Fundamentalist and Liberal
Secularism, Norwegian Centre lor Human Rights, http://www.strasbourgconference.org. for an in-depth review
of two contrast in forms of secularism.
244 "Memorandum To The Turkish Government On Human Rights Watch's Concerns With Regard To
Academic Freedom In Higher Education, And Access To Higher Education For Women Who Wear The
Headscarf",26 (2004), Human Rights Watch.
245 Meltem MUftliler-Bac, "The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union", in Sylvia Kedourie
(ed), Turkey Before and Ajier AtatURk (1999),240,246.
246 As concluded by the UN special rapporteur on the elimination of all forms of religious tolerance in his 200 I
report on Turkey; Jonathan Sugden, "A Certain Lack of Empathy", ZAMAN, July 1,2004;
http://www.zaman.com/?bl~commentary&trh~20050908&hn~9995.
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of [slam, 'Kemalist Islam',247 going as far as regulating religious teaching
in schools and dictating the contents of the Imam's sermons at Friday
prayers. 248
Unfortunately, such theocratic practices,249 which are in breach of the
principle of state neutrality, were overlooked by the ECtHR's superficial
review of Turkish social and political history. Furthermore, regarding the
Hijab ban and democracy, the ECtHR seemed to ignore the fact that the
democratically elected government attempted to lift the ban on Hijabs in
universities in 1995/s0 but the Prime Minister had to abandon his
campaign as a result of an implied threat from the military, that 'the
possibility of military intervention still existed' /51 and that the government
should be 'sensitive' to its secular desires. 252
3.3.3 Necessary or Useful?
The ECtHR also found it was necessary in the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others to consider the effect of the Hijab, a symbol
of compulsory religious duty, on those who did wish to wear it. 2S ]
However, Judge Tulkens felt this argument was unconvincing as the
ECtHR "has never accepted that interference with the exercise of the rights
to freedom of expression can be justified by the fact that the ideas or views
concerned are not shared by everyone and may even offend some
people".254 Judge Tulkens criticised the lesser scope of protection that was
given to Sahin under Article 9 for peacefully manifesting her religion,
while recently the ECtHR had held in, Giindiiz v. Turkey, 255 that there was
a violation of Article 10 where a Muslim religious leader was convicted
for violently criticising the secular regime and calling for the introduction
of Sharia law.2S i>
The ECtHR also justified the ban on the principle of the protection
of gender equality, noting that it was one of the'key principles underlying
247 Benjamin D. Blciberg, op cit. vol. I: I29, 153.
248 Ibid. at 154.
249 Even religious education is subject to "stale supervision and controt' (Turkish Constitution, A 24) to ensure
the state approved version oflslam prevails.
250 Elisabeth Ozdalga, The Veiling Issue. Ojjicial Secularism And Popular Islam In Modern Turkel' (199X), 47.
251 The Guardian, 27 May 2003, www.gllardian.co.uk/turkey/story/O.I2700.964020.OO.html
252 See Stephen Kinzer, "Pro-Islamic Premier Steps Down in Turkey Under Army Pressure", NY TIMES, .lune
19, 1997, at AI.
253 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/9X, para. 98, lOS (Eur Ct IIR..1l1ne 29, 2(04).
254 .ludge Tulkens dissent para 9.
255 Giindiiz v. Turkel' (2005) 4 I EHRR,5.
256 .ludge Tulkens' dissent, para 9.
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the Convention'.257 The ECtHR was apparently hindered by its own bias258
and appeared to be of the opinion that the Hijab was forced onto women.
This is evidenced as, even before it approached the principles of necessity
and proportionality to decide whether the measure was necessary in a
democratic society, it asserted that it believed the Hijab could not be
reconciled with gender equality.259 Armed with this premise, it arguably
undermined any exercise of scrutiny it was to embark on.
This appraisal was highly criticised as being inappropriate and
incomplete2W by the dissenting judge in the Grand Chamber.261 Judge
Tulkens felt that it was 'vital to distinguish' between those who wore the
Hijab out of choice and those who were forced to wear it.
The majority of the ECtHR, however, seemed to ignore, or omit
from its consideration, the fact that some women may wear the Hijab out
of their free wil1. 262 An obvious consequence of the ECtHR's ruling is that
a class of women in Turkey will be denied access to higher education.
This will include not only those who wear the Hijab voluntarily, but also
those who are forced to, as the prohibition applies to both private and
public institutions. Thus, unlike in Dahlab, Sahin argued she really had no
alternative choice. This was an important argument, and one prominent
human rights scholar was disappointed that the ECtHR did not address this
argument that Sahin raised. 261 The fact that there was no other alternative
should have been an important factor for the ECtHR in deciding the
necessity and proportionality of an interference.2M
The ban will also not help those women who are forced to wear the
Hijab, as it is unlikely that they will be allowed, by whoever is forcing
them to wear it, to remove their Hijabs to go to university.265 Thus, an
argument based on gender equality does not stand up to scrutiny as the ban
will only prohibit the Hijab in universities, whilst the wearing of a
257 Levla Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/9R, para 98, 107, 110 (Eur Ct HR June 29, 2(04).
258 See 258 Benjamin D. Bleiberg, op cil, vo!. I: 129, who is ofthe opinion that the ECHR were motivated to
uphold the ban by their own tears or rundamentalism, and could have been influenced by the 911 attacks. It
should also be noted that the Grand Chamber gave its judgement (10 November 2(05) whilst riot tires were
burning across many areas or France, including Strasbourg.
259 I"<,yla Sahin v. Turkel'. No. 44774/98, para 98 (Eur C. HR June 29, 2(04).
260 Judge Tulkens felt that the majority had not 'addressed the signification of wearing a headscarf'; Judge
Tulkens' dissent at paragraph II. Sec also Katherine Bullock, "Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil:
Challenging Historical & Modern Stereotypes", (2002) 32 Inll Insl olislamic Thought, 85-115.
261 Judge Tulkcns' dissent, paragraph 12.
262 Katherine Bullock, op cit at 85-115.
263 'Interview with Professor Kevin Boyle'; http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load-detay&link~26768
264 As it was in Cha 'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France, Application No 27417/95, European Court or Human
Rights. The
265 Benjamin D. Bleiberg, op cil, vo!. 1: 129, 163.
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religious symbol, that is apparently contrary to the principles of secularism
and gender equality, is permissible throughout Turkey.2M
The ECtHR viewed the Hijab in the context of 'extremist political
movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their
religious symbols' /67 and considered that preventing coercive proselytism
from religious fundamentalists was justified under the Convention.268
Religious fundamentalists had politicised the Hijab, and to prevent them
from doing so was in furtherance of 'a pressing social need' .269 However, it
has been argued that political Islam is not a threat to modern secular
policy, but is mistaken for fundamentalist Islam, with the consequence that
the threat from the fundamentalists is overestimated.no
Judge Tulkens argued that, to justify an interference with a right
guaranteed by the ECHR, only indisputable facts, not mere worries or
fears, should satisfy the requirement of necessity, and that such concrete
examples to establish a pressing social need in Turkey had not been
produced.271 Turkey failed to provide any factual evidence that Sahin (or
other veiled students) had been involved in any fundamentalist activity.272
Furthermore, although there are undeniable fundamentalist
movements in Turkey, it does not reduce the protection afforded by Article
9, nor the Contracting Parties' mandatory obligation under the ECHR to
maintain the rights and freedoms of all in its jurisdiction.273 Previous
ECtHR precedent already shows that even in extreme situations274 the
responsibility of the High Contracting Parties does not diminish. Professor
Boyle, in line with this argument, asks, as there are also Kurdish terrorist
organisations in Turkey, whether Turkey can 'avoid its obligations in
terms of human rights of Turkey's citizens of Kurdish origin. '275
As previously submitted, consistent with precedent, the ECtHR must
assess whether restricting an individual's rights is proportionate and
necessary in furtherance of a legitimate aim. In this assessment the
ECtHR must strike a balance between the rights, and take into account the
266 Judge Tulkens' dissent, paragraph 12.
267 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para 108-09 (Eur Ct HRJune 29, 2(04).
268 Ibid, para. 99.
269 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para 109 (Eur Ct HR June 29, 2(04).
270 Nicole Pope & Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Atatiirk and A/ier, (1997), 326.
271 Judge Tulkens dissent paragraph 5.
272 Interview with Professor Kevin Boyle: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load~detay&link~26768
273 A distinction must be made of times of war and other public emergencies, where a HCP may derogate from
Article 9 (including others) to the "extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation"; Article 15 ECHR.
274 McCann v. United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97; where it was held that even in counterterrorism
operations against known terrorists, the HCP must safeguard citizens rights and freedoms under the Convention.
275 Interview with Professor Kevin Boyle: http://www.todayszaman.comltz-
web/detaylar.do?load~detay&link~26768
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context, when deciding whether one should prevail over another. 276
However, the ECtHR never balanced the rights of Sahin, or other women
who wished to manifest their religion, against the rights of other students
not to be proselytised. Instead, it misapplied its own precedent; the ECtHR
relied on its ruling in Dahlab, that the Hijab had violated the rights of
others, to determine the same in Sahin. 277
In Dahlab, the ECtHR felt it was necessary to prohibit a school
teacher from wearing the Hijab, owing to the alleged proselytising effect
that the Hijab could have on schoolchildren. However, the facts of the
case of Dahlab are greatly distinguishable from those in Sahin. The
context in which the Hijab was worn and the witnesses to it were greatly
different: it cannot reasonably be assumed that Sahin could have the same
coercive or influential effect over university professors and students as
Dahlab could have had over her much younger, impressionable pupils.
Even if Sahin's peers or professors felt coerced, it could be reasonably
expected of them to have made an official complaint to the relevant
authorities, which could not be expected of the young children in Dahlab.
Furthermore, the Turkish government could not offer any evidence
that any student had been the victim of any religious proselytism or
coercion, by Sahin or any other Hijab-wearing student, either before or
after the ban was brought in. 278
3.2.4 Concluding Observations
It is interesting to note that, although the reasoning behind the
ECtHR's decision has been criticised, the sole dissenting judgment has
been considered as providing a 'more sophisticated analysis of secularism,
equality and liberty'. 279 It is respectfully submitted that the ECtHR did not
undertake a proper scrutiny of the government's claim that a ban on Hijabs
in the universities in Turkey was necessary. In the absence of such
scrutiny and corroborating evidence from Turkey, it was not clearly
established that the wearing of the Hijab was contrary to the principle of
secularism and necessary in a democratic society.
27(, Malcolm D Evans, Religious Liberty And International Law In Europe (1997),328.
277 Tbis reliance was severely criticised by Judge Tulkens in the grand chamber paragraph 12.
278 Ley!" S"hin v. Turkey, No 44774/98, para 108-09 (Eur Ct HR. June 29, 2(04); Human Rights Watch have
also reported that there is no reported incident of coercion by religious female students to other students
(interview with Professor Kevin Boyle): hUp://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load~detay&link~2('7('8.
279 Jill Marshall, "Freedom of Religious Expression and Gender Equality: S"hin v Turkey", (200(,) The Modern
Lmv Revinv, p 2.
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Furthermore, as a consequence of taking such a thorough
examination of the facts and arguments of the case, it is submitted that the
ECtHR failed to consider significant facts in making its decision. One key
fact was that the prohibition was not only disproportionate2~O but also
discriminatory towards Muslim women as other religious symbols such as
Christian crucifixes or Jewish skullcaps were not prohibited. This
arguably undermines the alleged justification of the law. If, as an
ostentatious religious symbol, the Hijab cannot be tolerated in the public
sphere in a secular society, how can other ostentatious religious symbols
be permitted?
The decision in Sahin is not a clear precedent to establish the Court's
approach to a future case, claiming a violation of Article 9 in regard to the
French ban. This is because the facts can be greatly distinguished from a
case brought by an applicant in France against the new law. It has been
argued that in Sahin 'the Court rested its judgment thoroughly on the
peculiarity of Turkey's history' ,w referring much to the specific Turkish
context regarding Turkish secularism and its fragile democracy as well as
historic and religious considerations in its reasoning.
An application against France would be brought by a student
belonging to a religious minority in the country, which does not share the
same peculiar social context as Turkey.
4. Secularism - The Key Element in the Reasoning
The principle of secularism has been fundamental to both the
prohibitions and the subsequent ECtHR rulings in the cases of Sahin and
Dahlab. It is also the main principle upon which the French government
has introduced the ban on religious symbols in public schools.2x2As
considered earlier, two main forms of secularism exist; liberal secularism
and fundamentalist secularism. Whilst the former is compatible with
human rights, the latter is not.
In the aforementioned cases the ECtHR acknowledged that the
measures brought in by the HCPs were to preserve the principle of
280 As Turkey could not provide any evidence to support an assertion that the prohibition what is necessary
grounds of maintaining secularism or public order.
281 D. Christopher Decker and Mamie Lloyd ."J.ey/a Sahin v Turkey" (2004) 6 EIIRLR. pp 672-678, at p 677.
282 The bill which the French parliament agreed to in 2004 was named "application oCthe principle oC
secolarity".
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secularism.'" It failed, however, to distinguish between the two distinct
forms of secularism.
In Sahin, the ECtHR provided a useful definition of what can be
considered as the role of a liberal secular state:
The Court has frequently emphasised the State's role as the
neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various
religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is
conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a
democratic society. It also considers that the State's duty of
neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on
the State's part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or
the ways in which those beliefs are expressed and that it
requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing
groups.
However, having provided such an articulate formulation, it failed to
effectively examine the definition of secularism in practice in Turkey to
see if it measured up to the requirements of a liberal, pluralist secularist
state. Gibson argues that, if the ECtHR had undertaken such an
examination, it would have recognised the existence of a fundamentalist
secularism regime in Turkey, which was prejudicial to religion,"x4 and,
consequently, found no 'scope for the application of any margin of
appreciation',2x5 which was key to its ruling in favour of the state.
4.1 Secularism in France
The ban on religious symbols in France is allegedly enacted to
maintain the principle of secularism; thus, it is important to review the
French interpretation of secularism and to analyse whether the ban is
compatible with liberal secularism and, as such, the ECHR. If an
application is brought to the ECtHR, alleging a violation of article 9
against France in respect to the prohibition of religious symbols, this
distinction may prove of importance in the ECtH R' s decision.
2X3 See Levlll .)lIhin v. Turkel'. No. 44774In, para 109 (Eur Ct HR June 29, 20(4) and DlIhlllh v Switzerlllnd,
ECHR 200 1,6-7.
2X4 It is intercsting to note that the t(,under of Turkish secularism actually despised religion: Nicnle Pope &
Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: ,1tllliirk lind A/ier, (1997) 50-62.
2X5 Nicholas Gibson, "Faith in the Cnufts: Religious Dress and Human Rights", (2007) ClImhridge LlIw
}ourt/1I12007, p 12.
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4.1.1 Principle of Laicite
The ongInS of the doctrine of LaYcite lie in the anti-clerical
movement in France following the French Revolution, which preceded the
separation of church and state in law of 1905. The term was first applied
regarding the opposition to clerical influence in relation to the debate
about the neutrality of public schools.286 The separation doctrine enabled
freedom of expression and religion for everyone within the Republic, and
was opposed to the powerful Catholic Church, whose influence was said to
have covered the 'whole of social, cultural and political life'n7. A
particular concern was its monopoly of primary education, which it is said
to have used to preach against Republican and Democratic principles.2N8
However, Lalcite has 'undergone a series of evolutionary stages ...
linked to the prevailing socio-political context' and the 'practical
application and exploitation over the years reveal that it is limiting,
inaccurate even, to define it purely in terms of the clear-cut separation of
churches and state'.289
4.1.2 Laicite and the Hijab Debate
The current socio-political context in which the doctrine is being
applied is the Hijab dispute in France. To apply the doctrine, which was
initially used to secure freedoms of expression and religion, LaYcite has
been interpreted by the government as 'a more active secularism, in terms
of which the nation is promoted as a fundamentally political society
fiercely independent of any religious authority, and one in which the
values of the state can be defended through the concept of I 'ordre public in
order to justify interference'29o with religion.
Supporters of the ban argue that the Hijab is incompatible with this
interpretation of French secularism for various reasons. 291 One of the main
arguments, based on the neutrality of state principle, is that the Hijab is
2g6 C L Glenn 'Historical Background to Conflicts over Religion in Public Schools' (2004) 33 Pro Rege
(September) 1 at 4.
287 Cecile Laborde, Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools, (2005) 13(3) JO/lmal ofPo/itical
Philusophy, 305-329, 318.
288 Ihid, P 319.
2g9 K Chadwick '"Education in Secular France: (Re)defining Lalcitc", (1997) 5( I) Modem and Contempowrr
France, 47 at 48,
290 S Poulter,' Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal Approaches in England and France' (19970 17
OJLS, 43-74, 74.
291 See Cecile Laborde, op cit; she argues that the Hijab and can be justified on principles or French secular
philosophy.
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impermissible in the public sphere as it 'immediately denote(s) religious
affiliation' .292
4.1.3 The Neutrality-of-State Principle
In 2004 the Conseil d'Etat published a report assessing the
application of the doctrine in France over the last hundred years. 293 In this
report it explained that the principle of Lalcite requires the separation of
state and church, which implied the neutrality-of-state, obliging public
authorities to remain neutral with regard to their opinions and beliefs. As
considered earlier, in a secular state, prohibiting state officials or civil
servants from wearing religious symbols may be justifiable by the
neutrality-of- state principle.294 However, a view of the principle which
extends the scope past government officials is distorted295 as the
requirement should not apply to citizens, especially school children, who
'are not agents of government, and should not be made subject to
principles that were imposed specifically to combat government abuses' .296
It is submitted that, in contrast with its historical application in
France of opposing the improper influence ofthe Catholic Church on state
institutions, the usage of the principle to restrict the religious freedoms of a
small minority of the population is disproportionate. Elhabti argues that
the requirement of neutrality in public schools 'means the neutrality of
teachers, of the space itself, not neutrality of students' .297
4.2 Liberal or Fundamentalist Secularism?
The Conseil d'Etat has been consistent in its definition and
application of Lalcite. Following the Criel dispute in the 1980s, it was of
the opinion that wearing religious apparel as a symbol of affiliation with a
particular religious belief was not itself98 incompatible with Lalcite. In
292 Speech by Jacques Chirac, president of the French Republic, Paris, the 17th of December 2003;
http://www.elysee.lr
293 Conseil d'Etat Un Siecle De Lai'cite - Jurisprudence Et Avis Du 2003, Rapport Public 2004.
294 However, Gibson argues that "requiring civil servants to waive all the individual rights ... would narrow the
universal jurisdiction of human rights unjustifiably": Nicholas Gibson, "Faith in the Courts: Religious Dress and
Human Rights", (2007) CU, P 16.
295 "What the current French government has done in blurring the distinction is a violation of democracy, and
is in direct contradiction of the traditional freedom ofworship enshrined not only in Napoleonic law but also in
the 1905 act which the current law makers professed to be extending":Francis Magnion, Muslim headscarves
and French secularism, http://www.headscart:net/index2.htm. 2003.
296 Francis Magnion, Muslim headscarves and French secularism, http://www.headscart:net/index2.htm. 2003.
297 Raja EI Elhabti , (Director of Research of Karamah, The Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights
Group); http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?Event1D~55.
298 In the absence or improper conduct such as provocation, proselytism and propaganda.
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1999 it reiterated its opinion, stating that LaYcite tolerated every religious
manifestation."'!9 The Conseil d'Etat also noted that 'one of the assets of
LaYcite is that it confirms that all religions have the right to express their
beliefs' .100
The interpretation which the Conseil d'Etat has consistently applied
is compatible with Liberal secularism: in previous cases considered
earlier,301 it annulled the ban on Hijabs in schools, where there was no
evidence of any disruption to public order or the school.
Nonetheless, the concept of LaYcite is dynamic, and although "the
principle ... is uncontested, its content is not".102 The definition of LaYcite,
which, supporters of the ban argue, justifies an absolute ban on religious
symbols, is not compatible with liberal secularism. An interpretation of
LaYcite which prescribes the need to purge the public sphere of all
religious signs is akin to the model of fundamentalist secularism, which
restricts the freedom of religious manifestation of both state officials and
citizens who enter the public sphere.}O}
This notion of strict LaYcite,04 seems to contradict the traditional
purpose of the doctrine, which was intended as a guarantee of religious
freedoms, rather than a limit: 'The principle of LaYcite has never been a
principle of exclusion; it has always been a principle of emancipation and
freedom'.305
It is submitted that the only interference of the manifestation or
expression of religious beliefs that liberal secularism permits is where 'the
exercise of such freedom poses a threat to public safety or mores or
impinge on the rights of others' .30(, This is consistent with the pluralist and
liberal values of democratic societies whose role 'is not to remove the
cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that competing
groups tolerate each other'.307
It is submitted that there is insufficient evidence from any of the
commissioned reports or independent research of a pressing social need
for an absolute ban on all religious symbols in public schools. France has
299 Ministre de IEducation Nationale, de la Recherche et de la Technologie c Met Mme Ai 't Ahmad. CE. No
IHI-4H6, 20 October 1999.
300 M. M. Idris, 'LaIcite and the Banning of the "hijab" in France', 25 (2) regal Studies (2005) 260-95, P 262.
301 Considered earlier in part 2.2.2.
302 McGoldrick (2006) 01' cit, page 303.
303 Ingvill Thorson Plesncr; http://www.strasbourgconference.org, 01' cit, p 3.
304 Ibid, P 15.
305 Raja EI Elhabti, (Director of Research of Karamah, The Muslim Womcn Lawyers for Human Rights
Group); http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?Evcnt ID~55.
306 Mr Kjaerum, mcmbcr of The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); UN Doc
CERD/C/SR.1675, paras 49-50 (20 of February 2(05).
307 Sahin (2005) 41 EHRR8, at para 93.
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not convincingly established3IJx that the prohibition on religious symbols is
required to uphold the principle of secularism.
Kjaerum contends that the Hijab itself does not undennine the
principle of secularism, even in public schools.309 It is further argued that,
worn as a religious symbol, the Hijab is actually compatible with Liberal
secularism, which promotes the principles of mutual respect and tolerance
within and between different religious groups. Support for this assertion
can be found in the fact that the majority of the Muslim population in
France,"o including women who wear the Hijab, actually support (liberal)
secularism.] II
Furthermore, the International Helsinki Federation has expressed its
concern that the French interpretation and application of Lalcite 'appears
to amount to advocacy of one worldview and seems to contradict the
principle of neutrality to which the state proclaims to be committed'.112
This ideology of secularism has been criticised as 'the mirror image of
religious extremism'.311
In conclusion, the French ban on religious symbols (specifically the
Hijab) and is contrary to the historical concept of Lalcite, Liberal
secularism and, thus, the European Convention.
5. Conclusions
5.1 Observations of Previous Rulings
In previous cases where the Hijab has been prohibited in public
schools, namely Dahlab and Sahin, similarities in the approach taken by
the ECtHR can be identified. The ECtHR has consistently allowed a broad
margin of appreciation, owing to the nature of the freedom itself,314 and
because the principle of secularism has been used by the HCPs to justify
interference.
308 Aulronic v Swilzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 485, at para [61].
309 Mr Kjaerum, member of The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); UN Doc
CERD/CISR.1675, paras 49-50 (20 of February 2(05).
310 French polls in 2003 suggested that 78% of French Muslims supported the principle of La!cite, believing
that it was supportive of religious freedom; cited in J Va!sse, Veiled Meaning: The French Law Banning
Religious Symbols in Public Schools, US-France Analysis Series (March 2(04).
311 Tulkens' dissent, para 10. It is interesting to note that Turkey did not challenge this assertion.
312 IHFR, A French Ban on Religious Symbols Would Violate International Protections of Freedom of
Religion, 17 December 2003; http://www.ihfr-hr.org/viewbinary/viewbinary/viewhtml.php?doc_id~5259
313 Interview with Professor Kevin Boyle: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
wcb/detaylar.do?load,odetay&link~26768
314 Kokkinukis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397, at para 47.
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Nonetheless, it can be argued that the ECtHR failed to subject the
HCPs arguments to proper scrutiny by failing to review the merits of the
decisions taken by the HCP. This lack of European supervision, which
goes hand in hand with the national margin,315 meant that the ECtHR failed
to assess the compatibility of the nature of the secular regime in practice.
In the absence of an effective proportionality analysis, the ECtHR rulings
lack supporting evidence316 to show how the measures satisfied a pressing
social need and were, thus, necessary in a democratic society.
Although deference to HCPs is consistent with the principle of
subsidiarity, which is incorporated from the ECHR itselt~Jl7 the scope of
deference allowed to HCPs should not be 'unlimited'J1X as this would
contradict the purpose of the ECHR itself. International human rights
courts and organs emerged because it became evident that national
democratic institutions were not immune to gross violations of human
rights and, thus, external supervision was deemed to be a necessary
complement.319
5.2 Consequences of Previous Rulings
The ECtHR approach in Dahlab and Sahin, illustrates a disparity of
treatment by the ECtHR towards Article 9 cases, compared with other
personal freedom Articles, as considered earlier. J20 The ECHR may be
considered as a minimum standard of human rights protection,J21 which the
HCPs cannot fall below. In this sense, cases such as Dahlab and Sahin,
may illustrate to HCPs that the standard of protection, afforded by Article
9, is very low and not easily violated, compared with other personal
freedom articles. J22
Furthermore, in regards to the necessity requirement, the ECtHR has
held in the aforementioned cases that the HCPs are best suited to assess,
315 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App No 5493/72 (Dec 7, 1976), pp. 21-23, para 47-50.
316 [t is interesting to remember that there was no evidence in Dahlah to suggest of any proselytising effect or
of any complaints within a substantial time period, from the loca[ community of her religious manifestations.
Also in Sahin although the ECtHR considered the proselytising efTect on other students and possible issues of
public disorder, Turkey could not provide any evidence of either Sahin being involved in any fundamentalist
activity or any complaints by anyone at the University in regards to her wearing her Hijab.
317 Paul Mahoney, "Universa[ity versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining
Some Recent Judgments" [1997] EHRLR, 364 at 369.
318 Ibid.
319 Adapted from Eyal Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards", (1998-
1999) 31 New York University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics, 843 at 853.
320 See part 3.
321 Michael R. Hutchinson, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights",
([ 999) 48 1. CL. Q 638.
322 See part 3.
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not only the existence of necessity but also, the extent of the restrictive
measures. However, without effective supervision of the ECtHR, such a
finding may prove detrimental to religious minority groups. The ECtHR
cannot expect that HCPs will always act in the best interests of minority
groups,123 who are numerically inferior and, thus, under-represented in the
political process. For these minorities, in terms of securing rights and
interests, 'international judicial and monitoring organs are often their last
resort and only reliable avenue ofredress'.324
5.3 Possible Approach Adoptable by the ECtHR in a Future
Application against France
It must be noted that, although applications have been filed against
France by applicants who allege to have their rights and freedoms, as
protected by the ECHR, violated by the French law, it is uncertain whether
these applications will be heard by the ECtHR. This is because the
aforementioned rulings, in particular Sahin, may prevent an application
against France being heard. The ECtHR has already relied upon its
previous rulings in Sahin to declare similar applications inadmissible.325
Therefore, it is possible that an application made against the French law
may also be declared inadmissible, owing to its similarities to Sahin.
Nonetheless, there are slight differences; for example, the restriction
in Sahin was imposed in universities rather than schools as in France and,
also, because it would be the first application against France in regards to
the new law, the ECtHR may allow the application. It is difficult to
predict the likely approach which the ECtHR may take to an application
against the new French law. It may adopt a highly deferential approach,
invoking a wide margin of appreciation, consistent with its previous
rulings on the Hijab. Nonetheless, having carefully examined the key
issues in the Hijab debate, as well as critically analysing the cases of
Dahlab and Sahin, it is submitted that the ECtHR needs to adopt a more
323 Capotorti provides a oseful definition ofa minority group - "[aJ group numerically inferior to the rest of the
population ofa State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - possess
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics ditfering from those ofthe rest ofthe population and show, if only
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language":
Francesco Capotorti, Studv on the Rights ofPersons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
78.XIV.\ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 at 96 (\979).
324 Eyal Benvenisti, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards" (1998-1999) 31 New York
Universitv Journal of!nlernational Law and Politics, 843 at 848. See also Judge Martens' dissent in Brannigan
and McBride v. United Kingdom (1993) 17 EHRR 539, at 590; Judge Martens also referred to the EtCHR as the
"last resort protect the of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention"
325 See part 2.1.1.
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interventionist role to address the significance of the debate, and provide a
clear and authoritative precedent.
If an application against France reaches Strasbourg, the ECtHR must
carry out an effective comparative analysis of the law and practice of
HCPs in order to conclude whether there is a European consensus on the
restrictions of religious symbols in public schools, providing
comprehensive reasoning for its conclusions. J26 If the ECtHR find that
there is no European consensus, it may, consistent with precedent, allow a
wide margin of appreciation. However, in determining the scope of the
margin to be allowed, the ECtHR may wish to consider that, as France
does not recognise minority rights, it cannot automatically assume that the
best interests of a small percentage of a minority group have been
considered.
Regardless of the margin allowed, however, the ECtHR must not
abdicate its supervisory role, and subject the HCP's argument to proper
scrutiny. It must ensure that France convincingly establishesJ27 that the
prohibition on religious symbols was in furtherance of a legitimate aim
contained in Article 9(2), and that the prohibition was proportional and
necessary within a democratic society, and was the least intrusive method
available. J28
Thus, the ECtHR must undertake a thorough examination of the
ideology of secularism which the Hijab is argued to be incompatible with,
and whether this notion of secularism is compatible with the pluralist,
liberal values underpinning the ECHR. If compatible with the ECHR, how
the prohibition is needed to maintain the principle is another consideration.
In assessing whether the prohibition is necessary to maintain the principle
of secularism, the ECtHR may refer to the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat,
who have consistently held that in the absence of any impropriety,32'J the
Hijab is compatible and permissible with Lai'cite.
If, in the ECtHR's assessment, the findings of the Stasi
Commission's report are to be considered, the ECtHR must remain open-
minded to the impartiality and credibility of the report and also to its
326 The application orthe European consensus analysis by the ECtHR has been criticised as irregular and
superticial; DJ Harris, M O'Boyle and C Warbrick, Law oj'the European Convention on Iluman Rights
(Butterworths, London, 1995), pp 12-15.
327 AU/ronic v. Switzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 485, at para [61].
328 An analogy could be made to the domestic case ofR. (on the application oj'Shahina Begum) v Headteacher
and Governors oj'Denbigh High School [2005], In that case, regarding a restriction on a particular item of
Islamic clothing (Jilbab), the public school in the UK, following comprehensive dialogue with the ethnic and
religious communities in the locality, adopted a school uniform policy which could he seen as the least intrusive
and most acceptable option for the whole community.
329 Considered earlier in part 2.2.2.
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relevance, noting the insufficient number of veiled women, invited for
interviewing, during the Stasi Commission's investigation. Regardless of
the conclusion reached by the ECtHR, it has an obligation to undertake a
thorough examination of all the issues. In doing so, it will instil trust in
the enforcement mechanism of the ECHR, as well as caution HCPs that
the ECtHR will hold Contracting Parties accountable to their obligations
under the ECHR.
In the current socio-political climate in Europe, the Hijab debate is
of paramount importance; many of those who are opposed to a blanket ban
on religious symbols in schools call for better dialogue. 33o If the ECtHR
rules against France, it will force France and other HCPs to adopt less
intrusive policies, and possibly open a more open and balanced debate in
Europe in regards to the Hijab.
It is argued that, through better interaction with those who wear the
Hijab, a better understanding of the real reasons and motivations behind
wearing the Hijab can be gained. Possibly many fears, based on ignorance
or through inaccurate and irresponsible media coverage, can be dispelled.
Furthermore, legitimate issues of concern, such as those who are coerced
into wearing the Hijab may be addressed.
Instead of broad disproportionate measures, which suppress the
freedom of religion of everyone, HCPs should adopt detailed, tailored and
precise measures in order to protect those who are being coerced into
wearing the Hijab, while respecting the independent and voluntary
decision of those who choose to adopt the Hijab.
It is submitted that, in accordance with the liberal, tolerant,
broadminded and pluralist values which underpin the ECHR, we should
'take a stand against those who would force women to wear the headscarf,
and those who would force them not to wear it. 'JJI
Baljit Kooner
Khalsa Aid (London)
330 See for example, Interview with Professor Kevin Boyle, op cit.
33\ N Walter, "When the Veil Means Freedom-Respect Women's Choices that are Not Our Own, Even if they
Include Wearing the Hijab", The Guardian, 20 January 2004.
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